
From
Challenge # 90
March - April 2005
The Question of Right-Wing Refusal
Conscience vs. Conscience
Stephen Langfur
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After supper she got out her book
and learned me about Moses and the Bulrushers, and I was in a sweat to
find out all about him; but by and by she let it out that Moses had been
dead a considerable long time; so then I didn't care no more about him,
because I don't take no stock in dead people.
– Mark Twain, Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, Chapter I.
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IF a nation-state enacts
an evil policy, it can later change its leaders or laws. But if you take
part in enacting that policy, you cannot later change the mind and body
that did those things. You are condemned to be a prisoner of your
conscience. Therefore it is a human right to place the individual
conscience above the requirements of the state.
That is the argument for
the right of conscientious objection. If we understand democracy not
merely as "majority rule," but as a system that ensures equal rights for
all citizens within the context of majority rule, then the
right of refusal is integral to democracy. To ask whether it
helps or harms democracy (as many Israelis do) makes about as much sense
as to ask whether letting people vote helps or harms democracy.
At once, however,
questions arise: the dictates of one person's conscience may seem evil to
another's, or they may come into conflict with the rights of others, or
motives such as cowardice or greed may put on the guise of conscience. Yet
these questions do not endanger the argument. As long as one grants that
conscience exists, it takes priority over the state. Indeed, this right
may be limited by other rights. And it may be difficult to determine, in
particular cases, whether the motive for refusal stems from conscience or
something less noble. In the US during the Vietnam War, when I had the
honor, the government spent a fair amount of time and money on the matter,
including an FBI investigation and a three-hour interview between me and
the Attorney General's representative. Freedom can be expensive, but it is
no luxury.
Israel does not recognize
the priority of conscience. It sends its refusers to prison.1
Until now they have been few and have come from the Left. People have
always challenged them, asking among other things: "What if someday the
government decides to dismantle the settlements, and the right-wing
soldiers refuse? Would you allow them the same right that you are
claiming?"
The question is no longer
hypothetical. The government has decided to dismantle the settlements in
the Gaza Strip plus four in the West Bank. In October 2004, 61 rabbis
issued a directive that soldiers should refuse to take part. On February
9, 2005, a movement known as Defensive Shield presented a petition signed
by more than 10,000 soldiers, declaring their intention to refuse any
order that leads to the removal of Jews from their homes. This figure
represents a sizeable chunk of the army. Each signer included his or her
military identification number. Spokesperson Noam Livnat asserts that many
more refrained from signing because they feared to give personal details.
Once mass refusal begins and gathers steam, he believes, these too will
join. (On Israeli state television, Erev Hadash, February 9,
2005.)
Do these 10,000 or more
soldiers have the right of conscientious objection? Is their refusal
really a matter of conscience? If so, must all consciences be given equal
weight? Is morality relative?
THE
PROFOUNDEST piece of work on the matter is Mark Twain's Adventures
of Huckleberry Finn. Huck and Jim, a runaway slave, are making
their way down the Mississippi on a raft in the year 1840 or so. Huck is
escaping from his dangerous father as well as from Miss Watson, who has
been attempting to civilize him.
Jim too is escaping from
Miss Watson, who owns him. They are looking for a town called Cairo, where
the Ohio River comes in. Their plan is to sell the raft there and take a
steamer up the Ohio into the free states. In the night, just as they
figure they're near, a fog sets in. Huck takes the canoe and tries to tug
the raft to a place where he can tie it, but raft and canoe get separated.
For much of the night he and Jim are lost to each other, each drifting in
the fog, bunking into small islands.
After the fog lifts, Huck
spots the raft and manages to reach it. Jim has fallen asleep while seated
at the oar, and the raft is littered with leaves and trash. Huck decides
to play a trick. He lies down in front of Jim, wakes him up, and pretends
to have been there the whole time, sleeping. When Jim protests and
recollects what happened, Huck denies it. He convinces Jim that the whole
adventure was a dream, which Jim proceeds to interpret. But then, to show
Jim's gullibility, Huck points to the leaves and trash, asking what they
stand for in the "dream."
Jim looked at the trash, and then
looked at me, and back at the trash again. He had got the dream fixed so
strong in his head that he couldn't seem to shake it loose and get the
facts back into its place again right away. But when he did get the
thing straightened around he looked at me steady without ever smiling,
and says: [For those who
have difficulty with dialect, I have paraphrased Jim's words in the box
at the bottom.]
“What do dey stan' for? I'se
gwyne to tell you. When I got all wore out wid work, en wid de callin'
for you, en went to sleep, my heart wuz mos' broke bekase you wuz los',
en I didn' k'yer no' mo' what become er me en de raf'. En when I wake up
en fine you back agin, all safe en soun', de tears come, en I could a
got down on my knees en kiss yo' foot, I's so thankful. En all you wuz
thinkin' 'bout wuz how you could make a fool uv ole Jim wid a lie. Dat
truck dah is trash; en trash is what people is dat puts
dirt on de head er dey fren's en makes 'em ashamed.”
Then he got up
slow and walked to the wigwam, and went in there without saying anything
but that. But that was enough. It made me feel so mean I could almost
kissed his foot to get him to take it back.
It was fifteen minutes before I
could work myself up to go and humble myself to a nigger; but I done it,
and I warn't ever sorry for it afterwards, neither. I didn't do him no
more mean tricks, and I wouldn't done that one if I'd a knowed it would
make him feel that way. (Ch. 15, end.)
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CONSCIENCE is at work
here, but Huck does not give it that name. For he has two consciences, and
the one he calls by the name first appears in the next chapter, 16. Jim is
looking for Cairo, hoping they haven't passed it. It occurs to Huck that
he might actually get his freedom, and his conscience gnaws at him:
I begun to get it through my head
that he was [al]most free - and who was to blame for it? Why, me. I
couldn't get that out of my conscience, no how nor no way. It got to
troubling me so I couldn't rest; I couldn't stay still in one place. It
hadn't ever come home to me before, what this thing was that I was
doing. But now it did; and it stayed with me, and scorched me more and
more. I tried to make out to myself that I warn't to blame, because I
didn't run Jim off from his rightful owner; but it warn't no use,
conscience up and says, every time, "But you knowed he was running for
his freedom, and you could a paddled ashore and told somebody." That was
so - I couldn't get around that noway. That was where it pinched.
Conscience says to me, "What had poor Miss Watson done to you that you
could see her nigger go off right under your eyes and never say one
single word? …"
I got to feeling so mean and so
miserable I most wished I was dead. I fidgeted up and down the raft,
abusing myself to myself, and Jim was fidgeting up and down past me. We
neither of us could keep still. Every time he danced around and says, "Dah's
Cairo!" it went through me like a shot, and I thought if it was
Cairo I reckoned I would die of miserableness.
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This is not something else
parading as conscience. This too is conscience, hurting the way conscience
hurts. I said that a person has the right not to become a prisoner of his
or her conscience, and here is the fact that gives force to the argument:
conscience hurts. But what is the relation between this
conscience and the first one, the one Huck doesn't name "conscience,"
which also hurt?
In the case of the first
one, there was Huck playing a prank on Jim, and then Jim said something,
and because of what he said Huck saw him. He hadn't seen him before, but
then he saw him. He saw him, let's say, in his importance as a human
being. A human being as such is important. That importance is the basis of
conscience. To account for this phenomenon, it is not necessary to suppose
the implantation of moral law from above. It is enough to recall that each
of us came untimely into the world and that we could not have survived
without the help of others, on whom we depended for our very being, who
were therefore co-important with us, and whose relations with us became
the paradigm for our relations with other people as such.
Huck's second conscience,
the one he calls conscience, develops in a setting where a
group of human beings is oppressed, their humanity violated, and the
oppressors seek to anaesthetize themselves in advance before
the terrible pain of conscience (first kind). The method is simple and
classic: Conscience concerns our relations to human beings. Persuade
yourself, then, that the oppressed are not quite human. Your duty is to
the human beings, the Miss Watsons. Or in the present case, to one's
fellow Jews. The structure of conscience remains the same;
the difference depends on who gets counted as human.
When we dehumanize a group
of people, guilt comes in by the back door. It does not then appear
as guilt. Instead of feeling barbs of conscience, we feel a dread of barbs
from those we have dehumanized, "them." We have good reason, in fact, to
dread them: we have awakened rage. (And some of them may do things which
make our dread seem realistic.) Because we have pushed their humanity
underground, this dread takes on a mythic dimension. They are not thought
of merely as subhuman, but as subhuman with demonic properties. Where the
natural feeling of guilt would have led us to repair the relation with
them, the dread of their revenge leads us to violate it even more. Thus
begins a spiral in which evil multiplies itself. The guiltier we become,
the more we must dehumanize them in order not to feel guilty, and the
barbs of conscience appear again as dread. The greater the dread, the more
we beat; the more we beat, the greater the guilt; the greater the guilt,
the more we dehumanize; the more we dehumanize, the greater the dread… and
so on, round and round. By a kind of inversion, the force of our guilt
determines the force by which we break and kill.
This process is set in
motion whenever one people violates the rights of another. The evasion of
guilt is the beginning of racism. The latter is not chiefly the cause, but
rather the symptom and result, of the violation of human rights. Its cure
is to stop violating them.2
In order to see
the Palestinians as Huck saw Jim, the right-wing refusers would have to be
in something like Huck's position, floating down the River Jordan with
Jim, getting separated in the fog, etc. But the Jordan is not long enough.
Jewish history (the history we Jews teach each other), from the Bible on
down through the Holocaust, then further down through the birth of the
State and the refugee problem, the uprootings and confiscations, the
education of new Israelis, the intifadas, the mutual atrocities, the media
coverage… is a much longer river and it flows the opposite way. The number
of left-wing refusers has scarcely reached a thousand during twenty-odd
years, and here the right wing gets 10,000 signatures in weeks. A wise man
said that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
The same is true of those who imprison themselves in it, whose vu
is always déja, who see in present enemies only the avatars
of dead persecutors.
What then shall we
conclude? Do the 10,000 have the right of refusal on grounds of
conscience? Yes, because conscience is conscience, even when distorted –
even when racism counts as righteousness. So let them refuse (and hand
over their weapons). But in admitting their right, we commit no
relativism. We do not say, "One person's conscience is as good as
another's," meaning that there is no good. The good is with those who see
the human being in all human beings.
As for Huck and Jim, they
missed Cairo. They'd passed it in the fog. They drift helplessly into the
deep and unfree South. Huck tries once to turn Jim in, but he can't quite
bring himself to do it. Then they get separated again. In Chapter 31, Huck
learns that Jim has been caught, although the captors don't know where he
comes from or who his owner is. Huck pens a letter to Miss Watson, telling
her to send someone to fetch her property. Staring at what he has written,
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I
felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first time I had ever felt
so in my life, and I knowed I could pray now. But I didn't do it
straight off, but laid the paper down and set there thinking - thinking
how good it was all this happened so, and how near I come to being lost
and going to hell. And went on thinking. And got to thinking over our
trip down the river; and I see Jim before me all the time: in the day
and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we
a-floating along, talking and singing and laughing. But somehow I
couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the
other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top of his'n, 'stead of
calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see him how glad he was when
I come back out of the fog…and then I happened to look around and see
that paper.
It was a close place. I took it
up, and held it in my hand. I was a-trembling, because I'd got to
decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I studied a
minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself:
"All right, then, I'll go to
hell" - and tore it up.
It was awful thoughts and awful
words, but they was said. And I let them stay said; and never thought no
more about reforming. I shoved the whole thing out of my head, and said
I would take up wickedness again, which was in my line, being brung up
to it, and the other warn't. And for a starter I would go to work and
steal Jim out of slavery again; and if I could think up anything worse,
I would do that, too; because as long as I was in, and in for good, I
might as well go the whole hog.
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Endnotes
1
Qualifications: A woman will be exempted on grounds of conscience if
these are religious or connected with her family's religious way of life.
This exemption reflects the fact that the ultra-orthodox, whose political
parties have clout, do not want their daughters exposed to army life. As
for men, in 1995 the army established a "conscience committee," which has
no articles or criteria and offers no right of appeal. Many refusers,
especially selective refusers, are never referred to this committee, and
in any case it hardly exempts anyone.
Details.
Back to main text.
2
The last two paragraphs are taken, with slight changes, from my
Confession from a Jericho Jail, Grove-Weidenfeld, 1992, p. 145. Back
to main text.
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Paraphrase of Jim's words, if you
have trouble reading dialect:
"What do they stand for? I'm gonna
tell you. When I got all worn out with work, and with callin' for
you, and went to sleep, my heart was almost broke because you was
lost, and I didn't care no more what become of me and the raft. And
when I wake up and find you back again, all safe and sound, the
tears come, and I could have gotten down on my knees and kissed your
foot, I'm so thankful. And all you was thinking about was how you
could make a fool of old Jim with a lie. That stuff there is
trash; and trash is what people is that puts dirt on the head of
their friends and makes them ashamed." Back to
main text. |
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