From Challenge No. 69 
September - October 2001

Talking Politics 

The Walls Close In

THE FIGHTING escalates. Islamic groups send suicide bombers into Israeli cities. Palestinian irregulars shell Gilo, a Jerusalem neighborhood built on confiscated land. The official Palestinian security forces stay, formally speaking, out of the fray. Yet the avenging hand of Israel closes in on Yasser Arafat.

Israel finds it easy to blame Arafat. Against its better interests, it steadily erodes his power and prestige. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres sees this as a mistake: "We must take care," he said in an interview with Yediot Aharonot on August 17, "not to transform the war against terror into one against Arafat." Israel has no other partner. Yet all the recent targets chosen by the army and approved by the cabinet harm Arafat directly. This phase began after the Islamist bombing of a Jerusalem restaurant on August 9, which killed fifteen. Israel responded by conquering Orient House, nerve center for Palestinian social and political activity in East Jerusalem. The takeover was a deep humiliation for Arafat, reminding him (and the rest of the Arab world) "who's in charge" of Islam's third holiest city. The next phase was political murder: an Israeli missile attack killed Abu Ali Mustafa, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, on August 27 while he sat in his office in Ramallah. Although Israel has assassinated many in the military wing, until then it had refrained from targeting political leaders. Abu Ali Mustafa, it is well to remember, entered the Territories from Damascus in 1999 under Arafat's protection.

The Palestinian leader's inability to defend his people from Israel brings him under fierce criticism at home. Now we have witnessed the latest and most extreme of Israeli measures: it re-conquered parts of Beit Jala (although as of this writing, August 31, it has withdrawn), presumably in order to prevent Palestinian fire on Gilo. (This fire had started again in response to Mustafa's assassination.) From Arafat's point of view, such Israeli entry into "Area A" illustrates his weakness. He considers Palestinian control here to be one of his central achievements at Oslo.

All these events occur while the Mitchell Report is on hold. This calls for a cease-fire, an Israeli freeze on settlements, and a return to negotiations. Israel demands, by way of prelude, seven consecutive days of quiet. Arafat is unable, however, to bring about silence on his side even for a day. His inability is rapidly hurtling both sides in the Oslo Accords to an outcome neither wants. 

Arafat's Isolation Increases

Arafat tried to reap advantage from Malley's and Sontag's pieces. He attempted to open a channel to the foremost group of Israeli intellectuals, including Amos Oz and A. B. Yehoshua, who met with PA leaders in Ramallah and formulated terms of reconciliation. By meetings of this sort, Arafat tries to drive a wedge between the Labor Party and Sharon, until now without success. According to a survey taken after the army entered Beit Jala, a vast majority of Israelis believe that every blow they inflict on the Palestinians is for the best. (Yediot Aharonot, August 30.)

Over against the recent critiques of Israel's behavior at Camp David, an advisor to the Palestinian delegation has recently criticized Arafat's conduct in the sequel:

" The present situation of low-intensity conflict will almost certainly persist for the rest of 2001, and in all likelihood for at least another year beyond that. Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat bears much of the responsibility for this precarious state of affairs, though not for the reasons cited by official Israeli sources. Contrary to the Israeli account, his behavior since the start of the intifada has reflected not the existence of a prior strategy based on the use of force, but the absence of any strategy. His political management has been marked by a high degree of improvisation and short-termism, confirming the absence of an original strategy and of a clear purpose, preconceived or otherwise. There has also been minimal Palestinian understanding of how particular modes of political and military behavior might lead to specific end-results."

These words by Yezid Sayigh, Assistant Director of the Center for International Studies at Cambridge University, appeared in the Washington Post on August 26. Sayigh continued:
" The start of the intifada allowed Arafat to employ a familiar tactic, honed throughout his long political career, of al-huroub ila al-amam ("escape by running forward"). Neither an initiator nor a planner, he has instead seized upon the fortuitous eruption of a major crisis or other dramatic event to obscure and escape a strategic predicament, and then sought to intensify and prolong that event as a means of inducing an outcome to his advantage."

Sayigh is accurate as far as he goes, but as an Oslo supporter, he ignores the political context that has led to the chaos. Arafat's situation is impossible. Sharon is a difficult foe, determined not to re-conquer the Territories - not to repeat, that is, the error he made in Lebanon. The Israeli PM does not wish to topple Arafat, but he isn't willing to let him achieve anything. With the help of the army, Sharon wants to bring him back to the table on his knees.

After an initial conflict of views, George W. Bush and the US State Department have reached agreement that Arafat is exclusively to blame for the situation. It is up to him, they think, to enforce the cease fire that will enable the sides to implement the Mitchell Report. Bush's position is even more extreme than that of Shimon Peres, who does not think it possible to achieve absolute calm and would be willing to talk under fire. Arafat, who acts within the parameters of the pro-American world, wants very much to soothe US opinion and be welcomed at the White House. The problem is that to achieve this, he must first show he can quell the groups that are fighting Israel. That would amount to a civil war - a step he has not been willing to take. Much as he loves America, he loves life more.

Problems are cropping up in the Arab world too. Mubarak of Egypt, whose economic woes have deepened, fears more unrest in Cairo's streets if the Intifada continues. In close coordination with America, he has urged Arafat to come to terms. Shunned, then, by both the White House and Cairo, the PA chief has sent feelers toward Syria. Within Arab political life, such a step bears the following significance: "I've failed, and I am passing over to the side of the ostracized, the lepers, those who appear on Washington's list of states that support terrorism." The turn towards Syria (whether threat or reality) broadcasts distress.

The present euphoria of "national unity" in the Territories likewise carries a price. Hamas preens itself on killing Israelis, but every suicide-bombing leads to sharper retaliation, thus bringing the critical moment nearer when Israel may decide to dump Arafat altogether, as well as deliver a mortal blow to Hamas itself. The movement lives by PA allowance, and it offers no practical alternative to Oslo. (See the article on Hamas in this issue.) 

Dynamics of Degeneration

The Palestinian leadership has never revealed to its people what Oslo would mean in terms of their day-to-day life. What is its significance with regard to the strategic ends that the Palestinians set themselves when they began their struggle? The leadership uses the rhetoric of a national-liberation movement, but in practice it has betrayed this. And where has the Opposition been? Both on the Right and the Left, its blatant opportunism left it open to co-optation. During the eight years since the White House ceremony, it has failed to prepare the ground for a different kind of leadership. The Palestinians are in desperate need of honest and realistic leaders, capable of proposing a strategy that can lead to a viable state. Such leaders would take into account the people's actual resources - but without surrendering on vital issues: Jerusalem, the settlements, and the refugees.