From Challenge # 63
September - October 2000

Talking Politics 

In the aftermath of Camp David 

Cairo Can't Deliver

On August 29 President Clinton made a brief, unplanned stopover in Cairo on his return from an African tour. The visit was intended to heal the wound in American-Egyptian relations after the failure of the Camp David summit in July. The White House had accused Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak of failing pressure PA chief Yasser Arafat into softening his positions. Arafat, America knows, does not make a move without consulting the Egyptian leader. In August alone the two met five times. That is why "the Clinton administration is focusing on the Egyptian leader, as a key to finding a solution in the Middle East, particularly on the future status of Jerusalem." (New York Times, August 26.) Yet a brief stopover by an American president cannot repair the bad feelings that have arisen in Egypt. These are the result of attacks on the Mubarak regime that appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post.
Jim Hoagland opened the campaign with a column entitled, "Egypt's Anti- democracy in Action." (Washington Post, July 16.) Here he protested the arrest of Sa'ad A-Din Ibrahim, an American citizen and Professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo. Ibrahim runs the Ibn Haldoun Institute, which will be monitoring the parliamentary elections in November. Mubarak had Ibrahim arrested after he produced a film instructing the public on how to participate in the elections. The regime doesn't like people meddling in its "democratic process". After heavy American pressure, Ibrahim was released. The most venomous piece appeared two weeks later, when Thomas Friedman published a column entitled "The Egypt Game" in the New York Times (August 1). Here Friedman composed an avowedly fictional memorandum from "Clinton" to "Mubarak", saying: "I have to tell you how disappointed I and all my foreign policy aides were with your behavior during the Camp David summit. I am going to be frank with you, you're skating on thin ice here.... More and more people are asking me: What exactly are we getting out of our relationship with Egypt - not to mention $30 billion in aid to Egypt since 1978?"

Friedman-"Clinton" touched a sensitive nerve. In the view of Arab public opinion, the US is getting a lot (too much!) out of this relationship: Without Egypt's collaboration, Washington could not have kept its military presence in Saudi Arabia - nor its blockade on Iraq, nor its firm grip on the price of oil. The US aid of $30 billion over 22 years may be compared with the $800 billion from the Gulf States presently staked abroad, mostly in the US. (See the London-based weekly al-Wassat, August 21, p. 40.) Clearly, without Egyptian involvement no deal could have been struck between Arafat and Israel. Moreover, Egypt moderates the strong anti-American feelings in the Middle East, which have their ground in Washington's utter disregard for Arab interests. No, Clinton knows the value of Egypt. No wonder, as long as Mubarak behaves, he turns a blind eye to repression there.

The Egyptians steer a narrow course between acting as an American puppet and keeping a patriotic "Arab" veneer. Internally, their government is torn by two forces. On the one hand, the old bureaucratic guard keeps its hold on the economy: According to Le Monde Diplomatique (October 1999), government industries employ 25% of the work force. On the other hand, the wealthy families are heavily invested in the private sector. If the government-owned industries were to pass into private hands, many would have to close, and unemployment, already at 17%, would rise. That could provoke what Egypt's rulers fear most: a social upheaval as in the days preceding Nasser's revolution.
The same specter haunts Egypt's relations with Israel. Too much normalization would infuriate the popular opposition, which Mubarak is ever on guard to contain. Mubarak rules a country of 64 million, half of whom live in Cairo and the Delta. His regime is completely dependent on foreign aid. According to the Spanish Nacion Arabe (Spring 2000, # 41), the foreign debt in 1990 reached $50 billion and the country had double-digit inflation. After the Gulf War, the regime agreed to undertake drastic austerity measures in accordance with the demands of the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund). So, for example, it raised the prices of basic products by 40%. In exchange, the US forgave $7 billion of debt. The Paris Club, a forum of creditor countries, agreed to cut Egypt's debt by half. (Only countries that implement the "economic reform programs" of the IMF are entitled to such consideration by the "club".) As a result, the government deficit dropped, and so did inflation.

Rising prices restored, however, the possibility of social upheaval. After the economic collapses in East Asia (1997) and Russia (1998) - with the fall of Indonesia's Suharto and others - Egypt's regime put brakes on privatization. It could not risk a big increase in unemployment or the loss of direct control over industry. If it went ahead with the steps demanded by the IMF, the regime would be risking its neck. Foreign investors responded by backing away, resulting in a poor overall economic performance during the last few years.
When the US is displeased with one of its client states, it remembers democracy and human rights. Outsiders suddenly learn about the problems of the Copts or the case of Professor Ibrahim. The fact is, Egypt does violate human rights on a massive scale. According to "Nacion Arabe" (ibid.), in 1996 - when the US was perfectly pleased with Mubarak - he arrested a hundred journalists and editors. In the past three years he has jailed hundreds more.
Weak, corrupt and frightened, the Egyptian regime cannot permit a free press or fair elections. Now Washington is using its economic leverage, trying to get Cairo to bring the other Arab states and the Palestinians into line with Israel's conditions for a settlement. The Arabs are to accept Israel's superiority, respecting its interests even at the expense of their own. But weakness, corruption and fear unite to prevent the regime from accepting Israel's terms. The US, says Mubarak, is insensitive to his delicate situation. To ask him to bend his head is to ask him to give it up.

Mubarak's recent hyperactivity concerning Jerusalem reflects his interest in warding off American criticism, rather than a genuine interest in the subject. He proposes a vague formula of shared sovereignty in the holy places, knowing full well that Israel, at least, will not accept the idea. He wants to be able to claim: "Look, I did the maximum. If I went any further, it would not only mean surrender to Israel, but also my own loss of power." Thus Mubarak is buying time, attempting to find a way out of the labyrinth without getting hurt.
Egypt's policies reflect the mood of all the Arab regimes. All are corrupt. None enjoys the confidence of its people. Their aim is to get American support without looking like traitors. They don't really care about Jerusalem or the fate of the Palestinians. How should we expect them to - when they do not care for the fate of their own peoples? They care for one thing alone: personal survival. The best way to survive, they believe, is not to do anything: no peace, no war; no reforms, either political or economic - long live the status quo! But this formula no longer holds. Tectonic pressures are at work: from Israel and the US on one side, from the Arab toilers and poor on the other. In the year 2029, Egypt will have 113 million people. They will have to have solutions. No corrupt regime will stop them.