From Challenge # 62
July - August 2000
Talking Politics
Assad's Death: New Snags in the Gordian Knot
Yacov Ben Efrat
the death of Hafez al-Assad on June 10, after thirty years in the Syrian presidency, symbolizes the end of an epoch in the Middle East. The new vacuum in Syria threatens to undermine the checks and balances that made for a measure of stability in the region after the Gulf War. Assad's death follows those of King Hussein in Jordan and Hassan II in Morocco, all within a short time of each other, with the result that their countries are now in the hands of young, inexperienced heirs. Nor will the course of nature skip over Yasser Arafat.
This is a nightmare shared by Clinton and Barak. With Assad's death, they know, they have lost a big opportunity. One could see this reaction on Clinton's face upon his receiving the news. In the foreseeable future, young Bashar al-Assad will not be able to deliver the goods. The peace process with Syria has gone into a deep freeze, and all that remains is Yasser Arafat with his shaky Palestinian Authority. The two patrons of the Middle East do not want to see him depart before getting his signature on a final peace agreement.
Yet Clinton and Barak are going to repeat their mistake. As with Assad, they are giving Arafat two choices: either depart from life without a final agreement… or sign a humiliating agreement and depart from political life. When the ailing Syrian leader met Clinton in Geneva, he was ready to strike a deal, provided he could get back all the territory Israel took in 1967, including the northeast shore of the Lake of Tiberias. Barak refused, with Clinton's approval. Then the biological clock ran out. Assad left an unfinished task to his son and a very complicated situation for Arafat, who now finds himself all alone.
By not signing an agreement, however, Assad outplayed Barak and Clinton on another level. In the framework of the Madrid Conference, it will be remembered, Israel couldn't get its way, since no Arab party was willing to be seen giving in to it. At that point, the leading lights of Israel's Labor Party - Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin - decided to slice the cake and eat it one piece at a time. Out of Madrid they first pulled Oslo, reaching a separate deal with Arafat. They stretched the agreement into lengthy phases. They had to gain time. Jordan, meanwhile, followed easily. Assad was left to dry out a little, on the assumption that he would have to give in. He died, however, without drying out, and his ghost will now haunt Arafat.
Arafat in a Bind
As long as Assad was alive, refusing to give up an inch of Arab land, it was impossible for Arafat to sign a humiliating agreement. Assad never hid his disdain for Arafat. He accused him of weakening the Arab cause when he signed his separate deal at Oslo. Arafat still had hope, nonetheless, that Assad too would capitulate. Yet he did not. According to Arab public opinion, Assad died on his feet. Under these new circumstances, how can Arafat sign an agreement forfeiting the Palestinian right of return or the right to get back East Jerusalem? How can he give up a vast portion of the West Bank? Assad, even in death, has spited him.The Arab World Is Disappointed
It is not only Assad's death that keeps Arafat from caving in - but the moods in the region. The Oslo Accords became a symbol of degradation. Arafat, once an admired national Arab figure, turned into a symbol of mockery. If this is what Israel means by peace, few Arab partners will be found.Although no love was lost on Israel, there was a time when the Arab world hoped for economic dividends. By improving relations with Tel Aviv, it was thought, one could gain easy entry into the global economy. In return for supporting American interests, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and others expected a 10% annual growth rate like Southeast Asia's. The last decade has shown, however, that the global dream is reserved for a few selected nations at the expense of the many. The Arab world is undergoing economic stagnation, with unemployment reaching 30%. Even the oil-rich Gulf states, notorious as American puppets, are feeling the results of their depleted treasuries. American pressure forced them to over-pump their wells, creating an oil surplus which has kept prices low. Lately, they have been reluctant to follow the American dictates, thus causing oil prices to rise to $30 a barrel.
Egypt's Foreign Minister Amru Musa recently gave vent to the present murky mood. He sees no point, he said, in holding a summit among Clinton, Barak and Arafat, since its sole purpose would be "to pressure the Palestinian side to give in to Israel's demands." The Arabs are disappointed, we see, not with Barak alone, but with the Americans too. Skepticism and suspicion have replaced the optimism and confidence that prevailed at the turn of the nineties.
The Two-edged Sword
At the moment, negotiations are at a stalemate. A summit with Clinton, Arafat and Barak is not on the agenda. A weak and isolated Arafat is promising to declare a Palestinian State on September 13. He received Clinton's solemn approval for such a move last year, when he agreed to Barak's proposal to reach a framework agreement as prelude to a final accord. Such a track, Clinton promised, would lead to a Palestinian State that even Israel would consent to.But since a framework agreement is nowhere in sight - and what Israel is offering does not suffice - Arafat's promised declaration of statehood has become a sword held over his own head as much as over Barak's.
When Arafat accepted the Oslo Accords, he told his people that if they were patient, the result would be a Palestinian state free of Israeli settlements within the pre-1967 borders. While Israel differs concerning the character of such a state, it understands Arafat's need to declare one. Whatever shape this entity takes in the end, from Israel's standpoint it is imperative that the declaration of statehood come about through mutual consent as part of the final agreement. Otherwise, the new "Palestine" will be impossible to contain. Thus, failure to agree means chaos. Should Arafat declare statehood unilaterally, Israel would respond with an immediate annexation of its settlements and their surroundings, leaving the Palestinians with de facto jurisdiction over a few isolated cantons.
Such a unilateral declaration of statehood would amount to admission by both sides that Oslo has failed, agreement cannot be reached and the conflict will continue. Yet Arafat owes all he has to Israel and America. They exalted him to his present position in order that he might strengthen Israel vis-a-vis the Arab world. Shall he say to his people, "I was wrong!"? Arafat has no alternative to Oslo. With or without Israel, he is doomed. He too must stall for time.
Meanwhile, Israel's third and last redeployment from the West Bank is long overdue - by two years, to be exact. According to the Oslo agreement, this was supposed to give the Palestinians all the territories, except for the settlements and the areas Israel claims for its security (e.g., army bases). Barak has not been willing to make this move, because he would then have to enter the talks on the final agreement with nothing left to trade (i.e., nothing he is willing to trade). He has insisted, therefore, that the last redeployment be part and parcel of an agreed-on framework for the final accord. Otherwise, he will redeploy from a mere 1%. (That is precisely the amount that Netanyahu, with American approval, had agreed on at Wye for the third redeployment.)
The Palestinians want a much bigger Israeli redeployment at once. Full of mistrust after the long delay, and fearing there will be no final agreement, they are demanding all the land they can get before the talks break down.
The Oslo accords have become a trap for all that became entangled in them. The Europeans are financing PA corruption, the Arabs see their economic and security interests eroded, the White House lawn party is being spoiled, while the Israelis and the Palestinians find themselves caught up in a dangerous game that threatens Barak's coalition and Arafat's political future. ?