From Challenge # 61
May - June 2000

Talking Politics 

Shock Therapy for Syria
 

Yacov Ben Efrat

The Summit in March between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and his American counterpart, Bill Clinton, has opened a new and delicate stage in the negotiations between Israel and Syria. Israel called the meeting a failure, while Syria minimized its importance, saying that its purpose was just to clarify matters. The Americans, for their part, contented themselves with a diplomatic cliché. "The ball," they announced, "is in Syria's court." 
Tennis is not a big sport in this part of the world, and people sometimes have difficulty keeping track of the ball. Syria insists it is not in its court, leading us to wonder: did it roll off and disappear? Well, no. A study of Syria's recent moves makes it clear that the ball is indeed with Damascus, and Syria knows this. It is frantically striving to send the ball back to the Israeli side. It uses two tactics. One, "the long-shot", is waged by that experienced back-hander, Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara. The other is employed by Assad's son and heir, Bashar. He plays close to the net, whispering to his opponents, "We do have things to talk about, but - soft and easy." 

The a-Shara Tactic

Barak has decided to withdraw Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon, with or without an agreement, by July. This causes consternation in Damascus. The ball has become a hot potato. It is a curious fact, illustrating the volatile and convoluted politics of the Middle East, that Syria opposes a unilateral Israeli withdrawal. We may explain this as follows. Syria has vast interests and influence in Lebanon. The Hizballah guerrillas in the south have killed and wounded so many Israeli soldiers that they have turned the rest into hostages. Damascus has been telling Israel, as it were: "Give us what we want, and we'll let you pull your soldiers out and also have peace on your border." By withdrawing from Lebanon without an agreement, Israel would be depriving Damascus of a major bargaining chip for inducing Israel to make an agreement. 

While Israel attempts to gain international support for a unilateral withdrawal, Farouk a-Shara does all he can to undermine its efforts. France, which in World War I occupied the area that became modern Syria and Lebanon, plays a key role in Israeli-Lebanese relations. The Syrian foreign minister visited Paris on April 25 to meet with French President Jacques Chirac. He tried to persuade him not to support the coming Israeli withdrawal - and in particular, not to send French troops to beef up the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. Such a move on Israel's part, said a-Shara, would aim at coercing Syria to accept Israel's terms for a peace accord. He attempted to play on supposed differences between the US and France concerning the Middle East, but he got a chilly reception. Chirac had already made up his mind, it seems, after a long telephone chat with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. How could France oppose a country that seeks to comply with a UN resolution (No. 425) and withdraw from Lebanese territory?

Farouk a-Shara explained to Chirac that a unilateral withdrawal by Israel would merely be a maneuver. Its long arm will continue to meddle in Lebanon. Defeated by the Hizballah, he warned, Israel will seek vengeance against Syria. He even cautioned against the possibility of an all-out war against both Lebanon and Syria.
Is a-Shara correct in his warnings, or is he merely composing an apocalyptic scenario in order to score diplomatic points? In fact, he is relying on signals from Israel. On April 16, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh (who sits beside PM and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in all discussions on security) gave a lecture. After the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, he said, a war with Syria will be practically unavoidable. The Syrians will heat up the border, and Israel will be dragged into a response. Israel will gain from the conflict, he added. Its military superiority will be clear for all to see, and negotiations will begin again, this time on a footing more to Israel's favor. (See Aluf Ben in Ha'aretz, April 18.)
A campaign is also underway to destabilize Lebanon. Students of the anti-Syrian Christian leader Michel Oun, who lives in Paris, have been demonstrating in Beirut against the Syrian presence. An unprecedented editorial in the Lebanese daily al- Nahar has called on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. These new developments leave little room for doubt in Damascus: if an agreement is not reached by July, Israel will do its utmost to make Syria pay the price. One method will be to ignite, in Lebanon, the sectarian strife that is already heating up. That torn country can tolerate no vacuum. If Syria is forced to withdraw, the bitter civil war of 1976 will likely re-open.

Israel seeks to behave like a regional power. It takes its models from big-power strategy. In the new world-order, big powers do not send soldiers to fight guerrillas. Witness the bombings of Baghdad, Belgrade and now Grozny in Chechnya: when a big power is challenged by a guerrilla group, it targets civilian infrastructure. If necessary, the attacks take in more and more superstructure as well, leveling cities. With its big-power air force, Israel too can carry on thus - if it has international support. After withdrawing from Lebanon, it will be in a good diplomatic position to bring its strength to bear upon the Arabs.
It is in this light that we should understand a statement by US Defense Secretary, William Cohen, in an interview with the London-based daily al-Hayat on the first of May: "There is the possibility of a very grave confrontation in Lebanon and other places if Israel is attacked." No, this is not a threat, he said. You don't have to play tennis with Cohen, however, to understand the remark as a warning, issuing not from Tel Aviv but the Pentagon. 

Bashar Assad - The Soft Touch

While Farouk a-Shara took his tough stance, Bashar Assad applied a softer touch. From Israel he summoned Arab Knesset member Azmi Bishara. He whispered in Bishara's ear that Syria might forgo the actual water in the Lake of Galilee (aka Kinneret), as long as it gets full sovereignty over its northeastern coast, where Bashar's father used to grill shishlik in the good old days. So far the Israeli establishment has not responded.
Why hasn't Israel snapped at Bashar's offer? It wants more. It wants Syria to accept a border a few yards inland from the northeastern shore. Damascus insists on the border of June 4, 1967. Israel says, "Fine, we'll call it that." In the latter's view, this 1967 border is not a line anyone can draw, but merely a concept. What is more, Israel is determined that Assad should not get a prize for his un-Sadatlike stubbornness. It wants to use the few meters of shoreline as a tool to humiliate Syria. Thus it will establish itself as the one that dictates the rules in the new Middle East.
Assad Senior cannot, of course, accept such a humiliation. The ailing leader has never been unequivocally beaten, and he refuses to undergo such a defeat at death's door. He is well aware, too, that such a surrender might prevent a smooth transfer of power to his son Bashar. Assad Junior, for his part, has more in mind than just the transfer of power. He is striving toward a social and economic revolution. The well-educated heir, while accepting the undemocratic procedure of "inheriting" power, desires to make his country fit for the Global Village. He is ready to get rid of the old Baathist ideology. This he recently explained in an interview with The Washington Post ("Syria Advances Cautiously Into the Online Age," April 27). Bashar is only asking for time. The key word in the title is "cautiously": in order to prevent opposition. 

No Time 

But who has time in the era of cybertime? According to Israel's strategy, an agreement with Syria must precede the final arrangement with the Palestinians. After Assad has made concessions, it will be easier for Yasser Arafat to do the same. But as long as Syria holds firm, Arafat cannot accept the little that Israel is willing to give. He would not survive the ensuing wave of popular opposition. Both Barak and Clinton know this. The interim agreement with the Palestinians was signed six years ago; Syria has had all this time to make up its mind. Now time is up, decisions must be made. In a last gambit to gain a little more of the precious commodity, time, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have gone to Eilat, where they can tread the waters of the Red Sea. 

Washington demands of Syria that it undergo the same kind of "shock therapy" that was used in the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe countries: privatize the industries, open the economy to foreign investment, get rid of protective tariffs - in short, let the rich become richer and the poor poorer. The social and political results of such policies are not hard to foresee - one need only look at present-day Russia. Bashar has reason for caution. Hard choices lie ahead for Syria: war or a humiliating peace, shock therapy or stagnation. After it gave up the military option, Damascus had no choice but to rely on diplomacy to further its strategic interests and secure internal stability. By supporting America against Iraq and by taking part in the Madrid Conference, Syria attempted to neutralize Israel's military might, while using Hizballah in order to maintain a role in the region. When Israel withdraws unilaterally from Lebanon, it will undermine this strategy.

What will it be then, confrontation or an Oslo-style agreement? The first will oblige the Syrian regime to mobilize its people for war. The second will lead to the loss of Syria's credibility in the Arab world, with consequent impotence and isolation. Whatever Syria decides (and it must do something with that hot potato) will have far-reaching consequences for the region as a whole and for the Palestinian people in particular.