Between War and Peace
By Yakov Ben Efrat

The Syria-Israel talks of January achieved no definitive result. Syria wanted a clear Israeli commitment to withdraw completely from the Golan Heights. Israel wanted first to work out the "nature" of the whole peace agreement. Taking a lesson from the Palestinian debacle at Oslo, Syria insisted on getting the Golan commitmentfirst, before yielding to Israel's demand. Israel refused.

Yet one cannot help wonder: what was the real point of contention? Israeli PM Ehud Barak has made no secret of his decision to leave the Golan Heights. On the other hand, when the Syrians went to Shepherdstown for the talks, they already knew that Israel would insist on doing things in its preferred order. What, then, angered them so?

The answer is to be found in the working document that the Americans placed on the negotiating table. (It was leaked and published in ha'aretz on January 13.) The content caused uproar on the Syrian side. For the Syrians saw at once how similar it was to the Oslo Accords. Their president, Hafez al-Assad, despises the latter, which turned Yasser Arafat into a Zionist vassal.

Before we turn to the American document, we need bear in mind the Syrian premise, indeed, the premise of the entire Arab world: Israel conquered the Golan Heights, and by all international norms, it should return them to their rightful sovereign without conditions. To give Israel peace and recognition in return for land that does not belong to it - what is that, but to yield to extortion? [NOTE 1:]

Viewed with this premise in mind, the American working document is replete with Oslo-like conditions. Among them:

1. The two sides are to have "bilateral economic and trade relations including by enabling (sic) the free and unimpeded flow of people, goods and services between the two countries." Sounds great! Great for Israel. But when a first-world economy meets a third-world economy, "free flow" means that the latter goes under. For the post-Oslo Palestinian example, see the interview with Adel Samara in this issue, p. 10.

2. The two sides agree to "terminate economic boycotts and cooperate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties." In other words, Syria would have to renege on its commitments as a member of the Arab League.

3. "Each Party undertakes to refrain from cooperating with any third party in a hostile alliance." If we remember the build-up to the Gulf War, we see what this implies: Syria is to be, from now on, a weak partner within the American-Israeli hegemony over the region. After Syria and its dependent, Lebanon - these two last bordering states - are put in place, the Arab world will at last achieve its destiny: as the stagnant backwater of the Israeli nuclear domain.

But are the Syrians really so weak as to accept such conditions - when the situation is such that conditions ought not to be made? Here is an excerpt from an important speech by Syrian FM Farouk a-Shara. He delivered it in Damascus on January 21 to the Federation of Arab Writers, a group that has stood out in its strong public opposition to negotiations with Israel.

"The question posed to all of us - and I am talking about genuine peace, as it is perceived by Assad's Syria - is whether such peace will help Israel expand its control and establish Greater Israel; war, after all, can help her achieve this goal more quickly, as there is no balance of power between the Arabs and Israel when it comes to a military confrontation. But if we convert the military conflict into a multifaceted political, economic, commercial and cultural competition, and if we isolate the military arms in Israel's possession ... then the results could be better, and tragedies will necessarily be fewer in number. This is because we will compel Israel to use other means that are not military means [at a time when] the United States and other countries stand vehemently for the principle that they will help maintain Israel's military supremacy over all of the Arabs taken together." [NOTE 2:]

Hizballah in Lebanon Reshuffles the Deck

When Barak went to Shepherdstown, he thought the situation in Lebanon was under control. No Israeli soldiers had fallen for months. His plan was to withdraw from Lebanon within the framework of peace with Syria. If Assad refused, however, to give him the kind of peace he wanted, then he would withdraw unilaterally by July 7, a year from his taking office. In any case, he would gain points in Israeli public opinion, and he would be free to retaliate against Lebanon or Syria if Israel's northern border were to be attacked.

After the Shepherdstown talks broke down, however, Hizballah raised the pressure, destroying the image of a cool, calm Israel. First, the guerrillas killed Hashem Akel, the number two man of Israel's ally, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). Israel tried to kill a top Hizballah leader in turn, but failed. Hizballah then launched a series of attacks against Israeli soldiers, using sophisticated anti-tank missiles with pinpoint accuracy. Within two weeks seven soldiers were dead and many were wounded. Israeli TV screened the evacuation of the wounded. For the first time pictures of soldierly blood, pain and fear got into the living room of Mr. and Mrs. Israeli. Among the public, as well as in the Knesset and even in the army, outcries for strong retaliation were mixed with equally vehement outcries for quick withdrawal - why wait till July? The polls showed 57% of Israelis favoring a pullback ASAP, even without a treaty. Barak was taken by surprise. Time, it seemed, was no longer on his side.

In April 1996, after a dismal Israeli campaign called "Grapes of Wrath", Israel had reached various understandings with Hizballah. The basic point was that neither side would target civilians. After these latest losses, however, Israel claimed that Hizballah, in violation of the understandings, had fired on its soldiers from civilian villages. It proceeded to bomb power stations in Lebanese cities, including Beirut. This was a deliberate escalation, launched to provoke a Hizballah rocket attack on Israel's border towns, which in turn would give Israel a pretense to strike really hard, destroying roads and bridges, perhaps even the Beirut Airport. Barak would thus send a message to Assad that he'd better get back to business in Shepherdstown.

When Israel bombed the power stations, therefore, 300,000 northern Israelis went into bomb shelters or fled to the south. But Hizballah refused to play along. No rockets fell. Instead, it continued killing soldiers in the occupied zone. Israel did get a political boost, though. On February 13, the US issued a very strong statement putting the blame for the latest escalation squarely on the shoulders of the Syrians.

War or Peace?

With full American backing, Barak has made it clear to Assad that he won't tolerate this game of "no peace, no war". "If there is no agreement until April or May," he recently said, "and none on the horizon, we shall know what to do. Everyone can understand for himself what will happen if there is no agreement." (ha'aretz, Feb. 13.) Barak repeated this statement thrice. The hint cannot be merely that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, since he has already said that out in the open. What then remains?

Barak's Deputy Defense Minister, Ephraim Sneh, helps us to read between the lines. Replying to a motion of no-confidence put forth by the Arab parties in the Knesset, he said that Israel is doing its best to reach an agreement, but if this effort fails, then every mother and soldier should know, "We did our utmost to prevent the outbreak of war." The Likud, on this occasion, sided with the government. Such unity develops in Israel only amid war clouds.

The belligerence is not one-sided, however. Syrian FM a-Shara made remarks of a similar cast to the Arab writers. They did not get translated in ha'aretz: "If the Israelis do not accept, they will lose, and if we succeed in getting back our rights and the whole of our land, it will be a big success for generations to come. But if, God forbid, we fail, then we won't lose either, because we will have won over international and Arab public opinion. ... We will tell them we made every effort... but those expansionists and racists want to impose their conditions upon us and on the Arabs. We should never accept them." (Translated from al-safir.)

Despite all the brandishing of swords, however, the last thing the US wants is another war in this region - especially since the price of oil is up to $30 a barrel and British oil reserves have turned out to be smaller than expected. After Washington issued the condemnation of Syria mentioned above, the Arab world reacted with outrage. People had taken all they could stand of the American-Israeli alliance. Even Egypt's Hosni Mubarak drew a line (at least officially). In Beirut, mass demonstrations broke out against the American ambassador and CNN. A worried US State department apparently saw it had gone too far. It reined Barak in, telling him not to bomb civilian targets.

Whether by peace or war, Israel aims to become the chief economic regional power, linchpin of a globalized Middle East, at the expense of the Palestinian people and the Arab world. Will Assad capitulate, accepting the unacceptable? At present each side is exercising brinkmanship, testing the other, taking care not to rule out entirely the chance for an agreement. Syria is clearly the weaker side, but it has not yet given in. Were it not for the US restraint on Israel, the chances for war would be equal today to those for a negotiated peace. But even in peace, if it comes, the results will be ugly.

Endnotes:

1. Some would reply, "But Syria used to attack Israel from the Golan Heights!" According to an interview given by Moshe Dayan - and cited recently by Syrian FM Farouk a-Shara - Israel provoked at least 80% of the incidents. See challenge # 44, p.14.

2. The Lebanese daily al-safir published the speech, which ha'aretz translated into Hebrew and English in its edition of February 15.