Challenge no.60

EDITORIAL

What's Gone Awry, Mr. Barak?

Things have not quite worked out that way so far. A heavy fog has settled over the Middle East. The Syrians left the Shepherdstown talks without setting a date for their resumption. The Lebanese situation is on the brink of going out of control. In Israel voices arise from both extremes of the political spectrum, calling for immediate, unilateral withdrawal and/or for massive air strikes on civilian targets in Lebanon. As for the Palestinians, on February 3 they broke off the talks, saying they could no longer see any difference between Barak and Netanyahu. Both Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Yasser Arafat of the PA gave Barak, six months ago, a generous portion of credit; he appears to have squandered it in large doses of arrogance.

Upon being elected, Barak set himself the goal of signing treaties with Syria and the Palestinians during his first year. There was a necessity in linking the two. His aim is to bring down the barriers between Israel and the Arab world. Yet Arafat, he knows, is too weak to get the Arab states to open their doors before Israel. Nor does Barak plan to make the PA chief any stronger. He intends to give him very little territory - certainly not enough to raise his prestige among Arabs elsewhere. The key, then, lies with Syria. If Barak can first bring Assad to his knees, the whole picture changes. First, he will have succeeded in closing the circle of peace with all nations bordering Israel - and without the help of Arafat. Secondly, the great blow to Palestinian pride will be swallowed up in a pan-Arab settlement including sovereign states such as Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

What has gone wrong? The main factor is this: Syria's Assad has not responded to the pressure in the expected manner. Barak offered him a generous variation on the Oslo Accords: he would get back virtually all of the Golan Heights, but laced with conditions of surrender such as Assad, so far, is unwilling to accept. (See pp.4-5 in this issue.) 

Arafat has become a hostage to the treaty with Syria, and he knows it. That is what lies behind his explosive walkout at the ill-fated meeting with Barak on February 3 at the Erez Checkpoint in Gaza. A month earlier, at a meeting with the Israeli PM in Ramallah, Arafat faced a difficult choice. As part of the series of deployments agreed on in the Wye Memorandum, Barak offered him 5% of the West Bank - but in the form of largely unsettled wasteland. Having refused these lands for weeks, Arafat did a turnabout, accepting them. Palestinian sources claim that Barak had made a promise: in the next redeployment the PA would be compensated, gaining full control in one of three areas bordering Jerusalem: Abu Dis, al-Azariyah or a-Ram.

After the talks with Syria failed, however, Barak changed the tune. This was in keeping with the logic stated above: Until he can get a treaty with Syria, he sees no point in advancing on the Palestinian track. At the Erez meeting on February 3, claim the Palestinian sources, the Israeli PM disregarded his promise of the previous month. Israeli public opinion, he said, still wasn't ready for a withdrawal near the borders of Jerusalem. He also insisted that the Palestinians agree to cancel the third redeployment, which was supposed to precede the final-status agreement; instead, said Barak, the redeployment ought to be incorporated into that agreement. Arafat burst out in anger. He refused to accept the maps of the next redeployment (from 6% of the West Bank). The meeting ended without a joint press conference, and the Palestinians cancelled further official talks.

Unlike Assad, Arafat owes his position as PA chief to Israel and the US. Despite the pose of righteous indignation, he has little room for maneuver. So, for example, people in the PA say that the decision to declare a Palestinian state on September 13 is final. But over what territory will they declare it? Over 29% of the West Bank? When most of that 29% is still "Area B": under Israeli control in matters of security? 

Israel went to Madrid and Oslo to reap the fruits of its long-standing military superiority over the Arab world. Seeking to make the latter kowtow to it, it behaves with dangerous obduracy. Even if the Arab rulers agree to accept its dictates, there is no guarantee that the Arab peoples will follow suit. These peoples see Israel and the US as a single foe. America's continuing aggression toward Iraq, as well as Israel's abuse of the Palestinians during the negotiations, do not pass without a response. Only recently we have witnessed two significant popular reactions: (1) the demonstrations now occurring in Lebanon against the US and CNN, in response to Washington's support for Israel's attacks on the power stations in Beirut and elsewhere; (2) the cancellation of a ceremony that was to take place in Ramallah, concluding the International Film Festival for Human Rights. About the latter:

Since the signing of the first Oslo Accords, Palestinian intellectuals have been taking part in numerous symposia with their Israeli counterparts, supporters of Oslo. Many in the Arab world denounced these meetings, since Israel had yet to give up its aggressions or withdraw from the Territories. The Film Festival was an example - a joint project between al-Quds University and the Tel Aviv Cinematheque. On February 10, the day of the concluding ceremony, Palestinian leftists demonstrated against the festival, and the event was cancelled. Thus, for the first time, Palestinians in the West Bank adopted the reservations that are shared by Arabs in Jordan, Egypt and Syria concerning any expression of normalized relations with Israel. The Arab peoples are signaling thus that they, at least, are not prepared to accept the conditions that Israel is trying to impose. 
 

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