Syria: The Peace of the Weak
By Yakov Ben Efrat

This time the Syrians mean business. Upgrading their representation, they sent Foreign Minister Farouq a-Shar'a to a Washington summit in mid-December with Israeli PM Ehud Barak. They even gave up their demand, as a condition for resuming negotiations, that Israel declare its readiness to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights. A new round of talks between the leaders is now scheduled for early January in Shepherdstown, West Virginia.
These moves are not the fruits of newfound love, but of a necessity fraught with suspicion. On the Israeli side, the necessity is perceived in economic terms. To keep up with the first-world countries, Israel will rely on high-tech exports fueled by foreign investment. It has a hard time attracting investors, however, as long as the Middle East is known as a place where war may flare up any minute. After Yasser Arafat's surrender at Oslo, Syria stands as the final obstacle to Israel's official acceptance in the Arab world. (Official - because peace with Arab regimes does not in the least imply peace with the Arab peoples.) Israel cannot advance its global economic ambitions without cracking this last nut. But why does Syria, all of a sudden, perceive peace with Israel to be necessary?

Between 1995 and 1999

Syria has agreed to resume the talks on conditions far worse than those that obtained in 1995, when Yitzhak Rabin was prime minister. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad then envisioned his country's future as a regional Arab power capable of matching Israel in strength. He was not about to give up this prospect merely to get back the small stretch of territory known as the Golan Heights. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1990 had not undermined his vision, although it had brought about a change of alignment: Syria backed the US in the Gulf war. It expected, in return, American recognition and reward. It received, indeed, a partial reward from Saudi Arabia, which supported it with petrodollars. But Syria remained on the US list of "nations supporting terrorism".

Ever since talks broke off in 1996, however, Syria's strength has waned. The internal struggle for the succession to Assad has uncovered the basic fragility of a regime that has ruled for thirty years by crushing all criticism. The corruption in the ruling bureaucracy has impeded development. The economy remains basically agrarian. Oil reserves have run low. "Growth" is in the negative. Water pipes go dry every night in Damascus. Electricity is rationed. Thirty percent of the workers are jobless. The average annual salary is $1200. The per capita GDP is $900 (it is $16,500 in Israel). (Data: Nehamia Stressler, Ha'aretz, December 17, 1999.) President Assad cannot help but notice that in poverty-stricken nations elsewhere, autocrats have been toppled of late, even shot. In addition, his health is failing. There is no guarantee that in the present situation power will peacefully pass to his son.

After signing a treaty with Israel, Syria would receive a direct injection of much-needed cash and get itself off the American "bad list". There is no other prospect for rescue. In addition, the American-sponsored alliance between Turkey and Israel (the two sandwich Syria in from north and south respectively) has forced Assad to take a new look at the geopolitical situation. Israel and the US maintain joint listening posts in Turkey on the borders of Syria, Iraq and Iran, and Israel's air force trains in Turkish skies. (Challenge # 54, p. 16.) With backers like these, Turkey had the clout a year ago to pressure Assad to expel Abdallah Ochalan. Suppose now that Turkey shuts off Assad's water, or confronts him again because he backs the Kurds. He will find himself facing not only Ankara, but also Washington and Tel Aviv. Assad can see, moreover, the kind of treatment Washington deals out to uncooperative leaders like Saddam Hussein and Slovodan Milosevic. He does not want to be next.

Syria has had to make a difficult choice: whether to cling to its pan-Arab aims, based on its longstanding alliance with Iran, or to join the global village under the America aegis. No doubt the US helped Assad make up his mind. Such things are not usually said aloud, but the Syrian president must have understood that patience was running out. Barak too helped him reach a decision. Israeli soldiers occupy a so-called "security zone" in Lebanon, Syria's vassal state. Its alleged purpose is to protect Israel's northern border from guerrilla attack. In fact, the Israeli soldiers themselves are vulnerable to attack by Hizballah guerrillas, who depend on Syria for logistical support. Israel would like to draw them back into safety. Fearing attacks across its border, for a long time Israel reckoned it could not withdraw except in the context of peace with Syria. This reasoning placed a card in Syria's hands: in effect, as long as Assad refrained from signing, he held the Israeli soldiers hostage.

Ehud Barak decided to stop playing this game. In an election pledge, he said he would pull out of Lebanon by summer, unilaterally if need be. Behind this decision lay a threat: following such a pullback, if Israel were to have border problems, it could pulverize the Lebanese infrastructure or even make war against Syria itself - with full American backing.

Syria is so weak militarily that an Israeli attack, backed by America and Turkey, could easily topple the regime. Under the pressure of Barak's proclamation, Assad saw only one alternative: to keep his regime alive at the expense of the pan-Arab cause. Peace, in such circumstances, does not bode well for the Syrian people. The mechanisms of globalization will go into effect. The World Bank or its avatars will no doubt prescribe "reform" for the Syrian economy, including austerity measures and abolition of trade barriers, with resulting unemployment. The recent riots in Seattle focused on the kind of fate awaiting Syrian workers and farmers, when their country opens up to the free traders of the world: more poverty and exploitation, while fatcat bureaucrats buy stocks in the global village.

What is Syria afraid of?

In his speech at the White House, a-Shar'a refrained from mentioning the Palestinian question. In this way Syria signaled an end to its role as the sponsor of the Palestinian cause. Damascus abhors the Oslo agreement, especially the manner in which it has transformed Palestinian national leaders into minions of Israel. Yet the deal that Israel offers its northern neighbor is not much different. With tiny exceptions, indeed, the entire Golan Heights will doubtless be handed over. But the gain of territory does not make up for the loss of regional hegemony and economic independence.
The American-Israeli alliance will work toward reshaping Syria's army. Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, that army is in shambles, unable to get replacement parts. Assad will have to ask for US military aid, and we may be sure that Washington will focus this in such a manner as to transform his army from one that can threaten Israel into a force whose main mission will be to preserve internal stability. Syria will be compelled to adopt the Jordanian and the Palestinian models, where the sole security concern is to protect the "peace regime" against internal troublemakers. We may also expect Washington to extract a commitment from Syria - as it did from Jordan - not to enter an alliance hostile to Israel. All the while, Israel will be permitted to maintain its nuclear force.

Oslo Revisited

Syria has anxiously watched Israeli negotiating tactics on the Palestinian track. It saw how at the very beginning, in the Declaration of Principles at Oslo, Shimon Peres persuaded Yasser Arafat to recognize Israel, although that was the only real card the PLO chief had. The Israelis could then keep shunting aside the issues important to Palestinians. Now Israel proposes a similar scenario for negotiations with Syria. Barak wants to reach an Agreement on Principles. The moment it signs, Syria will have granted its tacit approval to the normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab world - before Israel gives back an inch of Golan. As in the Palestinian case, the promise of normalization is the sole card the Syrians have.
There is also, as mentioned, a Lebanese card, but it can be played either way. Suppose that Syria and Lebanon do make peace with Israel. In the Pax Americana, Lebanon's economy will have more potential than Syria's, and the latter's army will decline in importance. Then the Lebanese may start getting ideas about freedom. As the last holdout before regional peace, Syria has the key that can open the Arab world to Israel. The latter will demand that as an advance. Then will come further demands. Syria will be asked again and again to prove its good intentions. Barak has promised to submit the treaty to a nationwide referendum. In order to stay in office, he will need a clear Jewish majority. Thus Assad will find himself, as Arafat has, drowning in the currents of Israeli politics: "Give in, or deal with another Netanyahu!"
Finally, even if the two sides do manage to achieve agreement, it is by no means certain that the Assad dynasty will survive. At the hands of the Israelis and the Americans, regimes like his are constantly under pressure to tighten the screws on their subjects. Witness Arafat: the erstwhile national hero today faces a critical and bitter people. A Syria-Israel agreement will come at a time when the Arab peoples have already learned that the Pax Americana brings them nothing but poverty and humiliation. When a regime has to seek external support to survive, its days are numbered.