Challenge no.59

The Manifesto of the Twenty - What Next?

Twenty Palestinians issued a manifesto on November 27, 1999 under the title "The Homeland Calls Us". (Excerpts appear on p. 6.) For the first time since the signing of the Oslo Accords, a group of prominent figures inside the Territories - all with strong records of resistance in the pre-Oslo era - publicly accused the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its president of selling the homeland.

Some say that if the PA had not reacted with a campaign of terror and arrest against the signers, the manifesto would have quickly passed into obscurity. Not so. Before this, no influential Palestinian inside the Territories dared openly to accuse Yasser Arafat of responsibility for the failure of the national struggle. Before this, none dared to accuse him of permitting corruption.

The boldness of the manifesto stands out when we contrast it with the programmatic retreat that has swept the ranks of the official Palestinian opposition. On December 18, the London-based al-Hayat published a stinging critique by Lamis Andoni, a Palestinian journalist living in Jordan. She described the abyss that today separates the leadership from the people: "I challenge the PA officials to go into the streets for one day only, stripped of their beautiful cars and VIP passes, to hear the people and their grievances. They would discover that the language of the manifesto is gentle and polite indeed, compared with what the people have to say about their leadership."

Andoni's critical barbs do not spare the leftist parties either, which failed to represent the claims of the people. (Instead they have entered a "dialogue" with Arafat. - Editor.) Nor do her barbs fly over the heads of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). She comments on a response to the manifesto that 200 NGO leaders and others issued on December 1, calling for "dialogue and self-restraint on both sides." Andoni writes, "How can we demand that Adel Samara and Ahmad Qatamesh restrain themselves, when they are under arrest?" (For statements by Samara and Qatamesh, see pp. 8-9.)

The manifesto amounts to a public acknowledgment of the crisis now affecting the Palestinian people. It makes no pretense of offering solutions, but limits itself to "sounding the alarm." This alarm is intended to open a discussion concerning the demands that a true opposition, once organized, must raise.
Among the backers of the twenty, some have already formulated a demand. Edward Said and other intellectuals from the Diaspora have initiated a petition of unconditional support for the manifesto. This document, which has two thousand names so far, calls for new general elections. There are those in the Territories who agree, among them George Jakaman of Birzeit University. In a recent article (al-Hayat, Dec. 25), he writes that the PLO framework is obsolete; within it one cannot come to grips with the changes that have taken place since the PA took over. Nor can the NGOs lead the way. Only an organized demand for new elections, writes Jakaman, can develop the basis for a new national political action. 

It is a good sign that prominent figures such as Said and Jakaman have opened a discussion aimed at healing the paralysis of the opposition. The problem facing the Palestinian people today, however, is too big to be solved by elections. A national movement has collapsed, along with its program. It is senseless to call for elections without first exploring the reasons for the failure. Within a viable nation-state, elections are a fine thing indeed. In the absence of such a state, however, the question arises: elections in what context?
When the Palestinian people went to the polls in 1996, the elections did not take place in a liberated nation-state. Israel still occupied the Territories. The people went to choose a leadership that would continue negotiations within the framework of Oslo. These were showcase elections. Their function was to shore up the Accords, giving Arafat the veneer of legitimacy that he needed after signing away the Palestinian birthright. There are certain basic facts that new elections - if held within the existing structure (the framework of Oslo) - will not change:

1) The Oslo Accords do not fulfil the minimal aspirations of the Palestinian people.
2) As a result, there will continue to be, among the people, strong opposition to the Accords and their creature, the PA.
3) In order to keep this opposition down, there will have to be a repressive regime, such as Arafat's.

As long as the Oslo framework remains in effect, the nature of the regime does not depend on personalities. It will not help to elect an enlightened liberal to replace Arafat, as if he or she might then give the old-timers lessons in democracy. Continuing to depend on the US and Israel, the new president will have to squelch opposition to the framework that the US and Israel impose. Without the possibility of a viable state, those in power will continue to grab all they can. The Manifesto of the Twenty will remain as timely as it is today.
To illustrate the importance of context, let us consider the Arabs in Israel. Until 1966 they lived under military rule. They had the right to vote, but what could they do with it? Today, when they are free of military rule - and presumably free to organize as a political opposition - their Knesset representatives instead support the PA with showy enthusiasm. In two consecutive election campaigns, they called on their constituents to back the (Zionist) Labor candidate for Prime Minister. 

At its fourth convention in November, the Organization for Democratic Action (ODA) discussed the questions raised above and came to several radical conclusions. (See pp. 20-22.)

1) The problem is bigger than the Oslo Accords, which aim to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab world. These accords are the form that globalization takes in the Middle East. The Palestinian people cannot achieve freedom within the context of globalization.
2) The Palestinian people will not be able to solve its problem with Israel apart from the rest of the Arab world, which will also have to undergo revolutionary change.
3) At Oslo, Israel foreclosed the option of a two-state solution, preferring to keep de facto control over the entire land. By maintaining its settlements in the Territories and by controlling the borders (land, sea and air), Israel spurned the Palestinian claim to a viable state. The Zionist movement went for the whole pie, and the Palestinians learned the lesson that Israel would never compromise. In its next stage, therefore, the struggle to free Palestine will most likely, for its part, seek the whole pie.
4. When the Soviet Union fell, so did international institutions such as the UN, which provided a forum where opposing sides could address each other as equals. The American "mediator" and its associates (NATO, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization) will not provide such a forum. No national-liberation struggle will be able to make progress except in opposition to the US, NATO and the rest. 
5. We delude ourselves if we think that a solution can be achieved without breaking the framework of Oslo and without getting rid of the PA.

The US is attempting to impose a new reality on the peoples of the world. To recognize this reality, however, does not mean to accept it. Along with other peoples that have not yet attained freedom, the Palestinians must take part in building an alternative to global capitalism, namely a global socialism, in which the needs of the whole of humanity will take precedence over the greed of a few. The wonders of the information revolution must be transformed from "swords" that impoverish peoples to "plowshares" making possible the fair distribution of goods.

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