elections 1999 - the israeli arena
Israeli Elections: Who Won - Really?
By Roni Ben Efrat
Israeli voters soundly rejected Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister on May 17, giving Ehud Barak 56% of the vote, but the upset stopped right there. In the wider Knesset elections, the Right grew stronger, winning 54 seats, compared with the so-called Left's 48. (For a detailed breakdown, see below.) Thus Netanyahu waned while the right wing waxed. How can we explain this?
Netanyahu was the first Israeli to be chosen in direct elections for the post of Prime Minister. (Before 1996 only the parties ran, and the PM emerged from the one that received enough votes to form a coalition.) Theoretically at least, the new system ought to have put enormous power in the PM's hands, since he receives his mandate directly from the voters. Yet it also created new difficulties: for the first time, voters did not have to link their choice of a party to their choice of a PM. As a result, the smaller parties grew at the expense of the two major ones. Their new power made it more difficult than ever for the PM to put a coalition together.
Thus in 1996, Netanyahu faced an ornery set of conflicting interests. He assembled a government that tilted far to the right, despite his campaign pledge to keep the Oslo process going. Having inherited a complex situation, he responded with nose-thumbing braggadocio, creating one mess after another, sinking deeper and deeper. He managed to drive out any of his ministers who had a touch of integrity, any who might have lent his government an air of seriousness and decency. By the time he reached the final lap, only one major supporter remained: Shas leader Arieh Deri, who had just been sentenced to prison for corruption.
Netanyahu and his cronies blamed the elite (the upper echelons of the legal system and the army, as well as the press) for not giving him a chance. From the start, he said, these groups hadn't liked his style and had refused to accept "the voter's decision". Here, no doubt, was a grain of truth. The Israeli elite is traditionally linked to the Labor Party. They saw no reason to make it easier for Netanyahu to rule. Yet his fall was not due mainly to them. There were three key factors:
1.An Arabic proverb goes: "He killed him and walked in his funeral." Netanyahu rose to power in 1996 over the new grave of Yitzhak Rabin. The camp of the victim could not reconcile itself to this additional blow. Many could not forgive the victor. He was responsible, in their view, for creating the atmosphere that had led to the assassination, and now, by a handful of votes, he had taken the office as well! Ehud Barak headed the unforgiving, and it was he who took over the leadership of the Labor Party.
In the view of Labor, Netanyahu was an anomaly, out of step with the New World Order in which Israel hoped to have a dominant role above the Arab world, an Order into which Rabin and Peres, bedecked with Nobels, had boldly led this country. As the term grew near for negotiations on the final status, so too grew the pressure to topple the misfit - that Barak, and not Bibi, might be the one to pluck the fruits of Oslo.
For all his fluency in American English, Netanyahu's tone remained a foreign one amid the new global discourse. His policy differences with Barak consisted of nuances only, but he appeared congenitally incapable of adopting the conciliatory tone that the New World Order required in relation to the Arab world. His diction remained antagonistic, even while he took upon himself - however reluctantly - the terms of Oslo. The inconsistency between his toughness of tone and his readiness for territorial compromise undermined his credibility in the eyes of his right-wing partners. His campaign slogan had been "Peace with Security," but as long as he needed the right-wingers, he could not fulfil expectations of progress on the track of peace. Before leaving for the Wye Plantation, therefore, Netanyahu prepared for a change of partners. In a series of secret meetings, he and Barak drew up the outlines of a national unity government. This might have given the country internal stability, but it would have meant legitimizing the unforgivable usurper. Barak held back. If Bibi moved toward peace, he promised, Labor would back him in parliament. On the basis of that promise, Netanyahu went to Wye.
Barak knew how to exploit the structural weakness of Netanyahu's position. While Bibi wheeled and dealed at Wye, Barak was at Bethel, making peace with the settlers. When Bibi returned with the new memorandum in hand, the National Religious Party (the NRP or "Mafdal", representing the settlers) split into extremists and moderates, and the extremists turned against him. Labor voted with the Likud, as promised, in passing the memorandum, but at the first opportunity - when in response to a guerrilla attack Bibi froze its implementation - Barak and his party withdrew their support. The coalition came apart, and the Knesset drifted toward chaos.
2. There was perhaps another factor in the putsch against Bibi: the American administration. Netanyahu had failed to learn from the case of Yitzhak Shamir, his predecessor in the Likud. Before the election of 1992, the US had conditioned the granting of ten billion dollars in loan guarantees on Shamir's announcing a freeze on new settlements. Shamir's recalcitrance contributed heavily to his defeat. So here: Netanyahu thought he could impose his swagger on the Americans. Uri Elitzur, the cabinet's last secretary - a settler grown moderate - put this as follows: "Netanyahu's problems with the American administration derive from the fact that he refused to relate to them as if to a superpower. He negotiated with them as an equal - as if he too were a major power..." (The Hebrew daily, Yediot Aharonot, June 18, 1999). Lately there have even been reports of direct American involvement in the toppling of Netanyahu. Here, for example, is an excerpt from an article entitled "Israel's American Vote" by Abdel Azizi Hammad: " (After Wye) Labor…coordinated its position with Washington in deciding not to join a national unity government." (al-Ahram, May 27 - June 2, quoted by IMRA.)
Cabinet secretary Elitzur went so far as to say: "I won't faint if it turns out that the CIA channeled money to Barak." (Yediot, op. cit.)
The Americans' real problem with Netanyahu, however, was that he didn't move forward quickly enough. Given their need to keep the Arab world united behind them while they bombed Iraq, as well as choke off popular opposition in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Occupied Territories, the Americans could have little regard for Netanyahu's problems with his right-wing coalition. They realized he was not to be counted on. He might start a conflagration any moment. He wasn't "of one mind" with President Clinton.
3. When the dust has finally settled, and the pundits have given way to the historians, Netanyahu may appear as the one who "laundered" the Oslo agreement for Labor, especially the principle of territorial compromise - and who paid for this with his head. His election campaign suffered from the fact that he couldn't sharpen the difference between himself and Barak: "The decision to divide the historical Land of Israel between Israelis and Palestinians was already taken before Oslo, and a significant majority of Israelis were for it. This majority has no interest in annexing the Territories together with their inhabitants. The only disagreement between Netanyahu and Barak revolved around the nature of the agreement: which of the two would leave more land in Israel's hands." (Elitzur in Yediot, op. cit.) Netanyahu's campaign failed because, for all his trying, he couldn't affix the "leftist" label to Barak. "Barak won't preserve Jerusalem" proved to be a pale shadow of the effective slogan from 1996: "Peres will divide Jerusalem." Accordingly, after three years of eroded credibility, Netanyahu had no rabbit left in the hat, and he had to leave the stage.
1. What do the numbers say?
Here we apply the term "Left" to those parties that prefer territorial compromise over an increase in Jewish settlements, and "Right" to those who prefer the reverse (or that openly supported Netanyahu). Simple arithmetic, applied to the fifteenth Knesset, does not leave the Left a lot to cheer about. To get the whole picture, we need compare the results with those from the upset of 1992, which saw the Likud ousted after fifteen years in power. Labor then won 44 seats and Meretz (the Citizens' Rights Party) 12 - a total of 56 mandates, compared with the right wing's 59. The Arabs remained outside the new government, in accordance with the traditional Israeli taboo, but they supported it with their 5 mandates, giving Rabin a two-vote Knesset majority. On this slim basis he went to Oslo. In 1996 the voters shifted to the right, and in the recent elections, despite the Barak landslide, the trend continued. The Left won 48 seats, including the 10 of the Arab parties (compared with 61 in 1992 and 52 in 1996). The Right received 54. The remaining 18 - most of whom come from the Right - were spread among three parties: the Center, the immigrants' Israel b'Aliyah, and the stridently anti-religious Shinui ("Change"). In order to form a coalition - without, of course, the Arabs - Barak sought common ground with either Shas or the Likud. There is a big difference, in short, between winning the race for Prime Minister and building a coalition.
Here is another anomaly: Barak needed the Arabs in order to win, but he will not bring them into his government. What - let them enter the inner sanctum, where they might hear state secrets! Thirty-three years after the end of military rule, they are still a suspected fifth column. When it comes to building a coalition, Arab votes are irrelevant. Thus, Barak prefers to depend on the Right - and not on those who elected him!
2. Peace agreements... with the right wing
Barak is known as one who prefers to hold the cards close to his chest. He has made it clear from the beginning, however, that he wants a broadly-based government, including a significant slice of the Right. He seeks to avoid the mistake of Rabin, who went to Oslo with the Left alone. Knowing that he stands before fateful decisions, Barak is taking care to cushion himself rightwards. The former coalition partners, the Likud and Shas, are wounded and divided. The Likud not only lost power, but it fell to 19 seats. Shas (the orthodox Mizrahi party) astonished everyone by jumping from 10 to 17. Yet it is caught in a crisis of leadership, stemming from Arieh Deri's conviction on charges of fraud. In order to finance its schools and institutions, Shas needs to be in the government. For the time being, Barak has chosen Shas over the Likud. He succeeded in playing the two against each other, getting each to scale down its demands.
A Greek giant named Procrustes was famous for lengthening or shortening captives to fit his iron bed. The first party with which Barak reached agreement on the basic guidelines of the new government's policy was the settlers' NRP - and not by chance. This party represents the right-wing limit on any future arrangement with the Palestinians. Anything the NRP accepts will be acceptable a fortiori to the Likud or Shas: neither will insist on being "holier than the Pope". After shortening the NRP, Barak stretched Meretz, thus fitting the right and left ends of the political spectrum into his procrustean bed. The remaining questions, at this writing, concern internal problems: the religious or secular character of the state, the rule of law, and the distribution of ministerial portfolios.
A study of the basic guidelines shows that Barak, apart from nuances, intends to continue with a tough stance on Oslo. In the time of Rabin, the negotiators managed to blur what lay ahead, but in the course of the years, the picture has become clearer. It is confirmed in these guidelines, the acceptance of which is a condition for entry into the new coalition. Here is a summary of those that concern the essential political questions:
3. The Left has pragmatized itself to death.
In Israel the term "Left" has traditionally been attached to Meretz and the Arab parties, because throughout the country's history they favored recognition of the PLO and a peace agreement with the Palestinians. These parties, however, cashed in the demand for a just peace when they threw their support behind the Oslo process (which nullified the possibility of a viable state) and behind the corrupt PA (which nullified the PLO). They were thus transformed into a superfluous appendage of the Labor Party. Since the new electoral system went into effect, with direct election of the PM, this camp has consistently drummed up support for the leader of Labor. (From 1992-96 Meretz was part of the government and the Arab parties supported it as a bloc from outside.) The call of the Organization for Democratic Action (ODA), that the Left should unite behind an independent candidate, aroused near hysteria in this camp. Instead of sticking to principles, the Left presented the theory of the "lesser evil". In the recent campaign, the need to topple Netanyahu became, as it were, a sacred mission - more sacred, even, than the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. This - despite the fact that Barak made no secret of his right-wing positions, nor of his desire to establish a broadly based government. The ODA warned that Barak would expel the Right through the front door only to bring it back through the rear, and that supporting him amounted, for the Left, to political suicide. The Left closed its ears. It is hard to understand such subservience on the part of Meretz and the Arab parties, except as a result of their desire to be close to the regime, with concomitant material benefits. Meretz wants to be in the government. The Arab parties owe their increase in seats, after all, to Labor, which refrained from campaigning in their towns and villages. (See page 9)
After the elections a senior Israeli pundit wrote, "The Netanyahu era was a fluke of history. Now we go forward." Israelis are wrong to assume, however, that once they make peace with each other, the reins of the Middle East will be in their hands. Sooner or later the final agreement will be signed, and the Palestinian people and the whole Arab world will see at last the extent to which they've been cheated. In the course of the long years of conflict, Israel nibbled away at Arab lands. The qualitative change toward which it aims is the legalization, by treaty, of these nibblings. The PA will accept the Jewish settlements, but the Palestinian people will not. The settlers live on Arab land. This will be a continuing source of violence. The Palestinian people, today bound to two masters - Israel and the PA - and estranged from the conditions that can bring independence, will again reach the bursting point. As soon as the final agreement is signed, removing the Palestinian issue from the agenda, the Arab states - including Syria - will no longer have Israel to blame for poverty and corruption; they will then confront millions of subjects who demand bread and work. Does Israel really think it will be able to " go forward" on the wings of globalization, while its neighbors remain humiliated, battered and hungry? The government of Ehud Barak will continue on the course laid out by Oslo, but that course leads to explosion.
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