The Barak Formula

Prime Minister Ehud Barak's new government is so broadly-based (commanding 75 Knesset seats out of 120) that no single component will be able, by breaking away, to defeat any bill he proposes. What is more, Barak has hammered a significant wedge of the right wing into his coalition. For the first time in decades, all the orthodox parties are included.
In the early history of the state, Labor and the orthodox were steadfast coalition partners. Then came the conquests of 1967. A messianic current, dedicated to planting settlements throughout the "land of the Bible", took over the Mafdal (the National Religious Party), cutting its bond to Labor. But now that the Oslo agreement has put an end to the dream of a Greater Israel, the Mafdal has split again. The extremists have broken away to form a new party (the National Union). The disillusioned remnant has joined Barak, signifying, perhaps, a return to old times.
Barak has managed, moreover, in the last two months, to bring down two central figures in Israeli politics: Benjamin Netanyahu and Arieh Deri, leader of the orthodox Mizrahi party, Shas. He succeeded in both cases. The first he beat in the elections, the second in onerous coalition talks. Refusing to accept Shas with Deri (who has recently been convicted of corruption), he cultivated the option of taking the Likud instead, till Shas - afraid to be far from the purse strings - caved in.

In building his coalition, Barak's tactic was to start from opposite ends and build toward the middle. First he brought in two ideological contraries: the Mafdal, which wants - if it cannot build new settlements - at least to enlarge the existing ones, and the left-wing Meretz (Citizens' Rights), which seeks to separate religion from state. After getting both to agree to his guidelines, he went on to Shas and the others, parties that need to be on the inside more than the inside needs them. To the leaders from lists other than his own he gave the most important posts, thus ensuring that they would not, in a pinch, join the right-wing opposition. This tactic caused great bitterness in Labor, which has been left with minor ministries. Some went so far as to claim that Barak intends to destroy his party in favor of the fictive bloc he organized around it, known as "One Israel".
Another thing happened on the way to the forum. The number of Knesset members dropped, in effect, to 110. For the ten Arab seats have become irrelevant: Barak won't need them. He courted the Arabs, took 94% of their vote, and brutally turned his back. Upon meeting with their MK's at last, in order to "update" them on the fait accompli of his coalition, he did not bother to request their support. All this comes in the wake of his campaign slogan, pasted all over the Arab areas, "The state - for all!" Thus, a government that proclaims a return to sanity, democratic values, and the rule of law, tolerates (albeit with a twinge of discomfort) a regime of apartheid.
David Liba'i, former Justice Minister under Yitzhak Rabin, headed the coalition talks for Barak. Asked why no Arab party had been invited to negotiate, he replied: "I don't feel good about it. One of the three lists was ready to join the coalition, as long as the Mafdal didn't. From my point of view, there is no reason not to include an Arab party, provided it's willing to sign our basic policy guidelines. I do believe that once the final-status agreement with the Palestinians is confirmed, at least one Arab minister will sit in the government, and there will be an Arab party in the coalition." (Interview with Gideon Allon in Ha'aretz, July 5.) That is to say: once the agreement is signed, sealed and no longer subject to influence, the Labor Party will consider bringing an Arab minister in - provided he carries a rubber stamp. (This is not to suggest sorrow, on our part, over the absence of such a minister. Rather, we criticize the Arab parties that gave their support to Barak, empowering him to carry out an anti-Palestinian policy.)

Fortified by a coalition that will keep him from skidding leftward, Barak can proceed to the labors in which his rival failed: the final-status agreement with the Palestinians and a separate peace with Syria. First, however, there must be a visit to Bill. In Washington, he and Clinton will quickly coordinate positions, restoring the traditional harmony between America and Israel.
Barak finds before him an Arab world that is weaker than it was in 1996. Among the Palestinians bitterness is great. Apart from the economic siege enforced by Israel, their regime shrouds most of its budget in secrecy. Officially, it amounts to one billion dollars. (For the sake of comparison, Israel's education budget alone comes to five billion dollars.) But the lion's share is not reported. As for the legal system, the courts have become irrelevant; various security organizations take their place, as well as the family clans. Municipal elections, originally scheduled for 1994, have yet to be held. With no stable structures behind him, Arafat goes to the final-status negotiations in a state of weakness. Recently he tried to show his muscles by staging "a day of wrath" against the settlements. It fell flat. (See p.18)
Syria, for its part, has awakened from the Netanyahu years only to discover that its cards have faded. The long stalemate has had the effect of softening Hafez al-Assad. He grows old. Almost a decade has passed since the Soviet Union fell, and the Americans have yet to declare him kosher. He must make a choice: either to take his place on the lepers' list, along with Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammad Kaddafi, and Slobodan Milosevic, or to become a minor partner in the regional firm of America, America, America and Israel. There are signs that the Israelis may withdraw unilaterally from southern Lebanon, an act that would severely weaken Assad's bargaining position. His economy is on the verge of collapse. In short, he has much less room for maneuver than during the talks of the Rabin era. If he doesn't want to stay out in the cold, Assad will have to make concessions, letting Israel assume the position it has so long wanted in a "peaceful" Middle East.
In his glory years, when he was a general, Barak's soldiers dubbed him "Napoleon". Napoleon liked to call himself "the clock of the world". Barak's ambitions, no doubt, do not extend so far. He would make do with "clock of the Middle East". Napoleon died on St. Helena. The clock ticks on.