Saddam and the Palestinian Prisoners

During four December days, the US and Britain fired about five hundred missiles and bombs on Iraq, more than in the entire Gulf War. Despite the damage, there is general agreement that Saddam Hussein won this round. In an age of mass media and public opinion, military supremacy does not suffice. Zvi Barel of Ha'aretz puts the matter succinctly: "If the effect is to transform Saddam from a miserable underdog to an unfettered hero, then it doesn't matter how many Tomahawk Missiles were fired, or how many communication centers and electricity towers were taken out in Baghdad. That was not the purpose of the war. The hero-image, once it cleaves to a type like Saddam, itself becomes a strategic threat to his neighbors far and near." (Dec. 20.) Several factors gave Saddam the upper hand this round:

1. Clinton decided to attack Iraq at a time when his reputation lay at its nadir. He had just completed an unsuccessful visit to the Middle East, where he had failed to jump start the Wye Memorandum. Congress was on the verge of impeaching him. Given this combination of circumstances, the attack on Iraq appeared to arise from ulterior motives. Much of the world saw the American president as trying to revive his image at the cost of other people's blood.

2. By contrast with the December attack, back in February the US had tried to renew the old coalition against Iraq by means of the UN. This time, however, America went it alone with Britain. The near solitude forced it to limit its goals from the outset. The action turned out, therefore, to be merely a slap on the wrist of Saddam, rather than a sustained campaign with political logic behind it.

3. In November, when the US was very close to launching a strike, it succeeded in pressuring its old Arab allies from 1991, Syria and Egypt, to come out with a statement that Saddam would bear the responsibility if America struck. That was not, however, the view of the Arab peoples. Their feelings came to expression in December. The bombing of Iraq just before Ramadan brought thousands into the streets in Cairo and Damascus, where demonstrators ravaged the house of the American ambassador. Not only did this go contrary to the wishes of the Syrian government, but the demonstration got out of control. That was merely a hint of what may occur in the Middle East if the attacks on Iraq continue.

4. The moment America forwent the UN inspection regime and chose military action, the Iraqi position – as voiced by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz – took on a compelling logic: Either inspection or sanctions, not both. – If you want to inspect us, then set a date for the end of sanctions. But if you keep strangling us, why should we let you poke about in our storehouses? The Iraqis exposed the American ploy: Washington had used the inspectors not in order to reach a solution, rather as a device that would give it excuses to turn the screw of sanctions until Saddam fell. The attacks of December proved counter-productive, exposing the US and Britain as impotent. The key factor was the Iraqi determination to forgo diplomatic efforts this time and absorb the strike. The capacity to do that constituted, ironically, Saddam's only remaining room for maneuver. Any further surrender to the UN inspectors would have strengthened the American strategy, which has turned the isolation of Iraq into a symbol for the New World Order in the Middle East.

The Palestinians can learn from Saddam. Ten days before the attack on Iraq, the Palestinian political prisoners opened a hunger strike, demanding their freedom in accordance with the Oslo agreement. The disregard for the prisoners and their families has become a symbol of Oslo's failure. Just as the Americans are bent on humiliating Iraq, so the Israelis are determined to tamp down the Palestinian people. They will open an airport for the jet set, yes, but on the issue that ordinary families care about, no go! This is not the place to descant on Arafat's betrayal. By signing at Oslo, he caved in on much broader issues than the liberation of his soldiers from captivity. Nor is it the place to lecture the prisoners about what they should do. Those among us who have experienced the insides of Israeli jails remember how dark it is there. Yet surely, there are prisoners today who are raising the following questions:

Isn't it high time to get free of the illusion that the Oslo accord, which was designed to bury the Palestinian question, can serve as an instrument for liberation? People who wish to conduct an effective struggle must beware of mechanisms made by the enemy. Just as Saddam understood that the combination of sanctions and inspections would never extricate him from the American vice, so must the prisoners recognize that Oslo cannot get them out. As long as they support it and its creature, the Palestinian Authority, their pronouncements are just so much "letting off steam". It is time that they stop seeing themselves as soldiers lying abandoned on the battlefield after the war has ended, and take up instead the role of commanders, laying out a new alternative for the liberation of their people.