Challenge no.49

palestinian authority

Who killed Muhi a-Din Sharif?

Funeral of Muhi A Din Sharif

by Roni Ben Efrat with Diana Mardi

On Sunday, March 29, around nine in the evening, a Fiat Uno exploded at a garage in Betunia, next to Ramallah. Nearby was the body of Muhi a-Din Sharif, known as Engineer # 2. His death is a mystery that may never be solved. While Israel keeps mum, the accounts of the Palestinian Authority (PA) have flip-flopped almost as rapidly as the weather at this time of year. Both sides had reasons for wanting Sharif dead: Israel, because it holds him responsible for the preparation of bombs that killed 65 people; the PA, because the military wing of Hamas, in which he was a leader, threatens to undermine its authority on all fronts. Likewise, either side could have strong reasons for hiding its involvement. Of the two threads that might conceivably lead somewhere, Israel holds one, namely, the wreckage of the car, and the PA the other: a 19-year-old student named Ghassan Adasi, whose confession it claims to have.

The death poses a test for the PA. At issue are its relations with Israel and the US, on the one hand, and with its own people on the other. Unless Arafat and his forces can demonstrate that they are firmly in control, Israel will not be willing to inch forward, however haltingly and partially, in the "peace process." The PA must demonstrate its willingness and ability to hold Hamas down, yet it must also show that it can keep its credibility with the Palestinian people. If it killed Sharif, or helped in his killing, that will gain it points with Israel and the US. But it must not be seen to have done so. Within Hamas itself, the death also poses a test. If the Islamic movement smooths over the question of who killed one of its leaders, then it will lose face with the people – whether or not it avenges him by an attack against Israel.

Who killed Muhi a-Din Sharif? First account (March 30 - April 1) : "hoist by his own petard." The garage where the Uno blew up on March 29 is in Area A, where the PA is supposed to control everything, including security. Nearby is the prison of the PA's Preventive Security Force, run by Jibril Rajoub. In a sterling example of security cooperation, the PA allowed Israel's experts to survey the area of the blast. The latter reported finding a large quantity of material for making bombs, similar, it claimed, to that uncovered at Hamas laboratories in Nablus and Beit Sahour. The first and major explosion, the Israelis asserted, came not from the car, but from elsewhere in the garage; it ignited a small amount of explosive material that was in the car. (Ha'aretz, April 2.) The PA sent the wreckage of the Fiat to Israeli police headquarters, which has held it ever since. The day after the blast, March 30, the PA published an obscure provisional announcement, reporting that there had been an explosion and that two Palestinians had been killed. One it did not identify; the second was said to be a PA security officer. (On April 1 it withdrew the report concerning this second victim.) The explosion, the PA also stated, was probably the result of what is euphemistically called a "work accident," apparently related to Hamas. In other words, someone was killed while preparing a bomb.

In fact, PA officials had quickly identified Sharif (his face had not been damaged), but they were waiting for Chairperson Yassir Arafat to return from abroad. The first to inform the family were not Palestinians at all, rather members of Israel's General Security Services (GSS or "Shin Beth"). Roni Ben Efrat and Diana Mardi of Challenge heard the family's account of that conversation during a visit to their home in Beit Hanina on April 9. Two rooms remain in the house. (Israel destroyed most of it two years ago, because Sharif had lived there before becoming a fugitive.) There is a storeroom, where the parents live, and another small chamber, where Sharif's older brother Ibrahim lives with his wife, Maysoun, and four children. Maysoun spoke, while rocking her newborn son: "They used to come often to ask where he was. This time it was different. They came on Tuesday, March 31st, at ten in the evening. I was here with Ibrahim and the children. Their chief was 'Captain Roni,' who's in charge of our area. He was very jolly that night, and he said to me, 'Mabruk!' ('Congratulations!'), because the last time he was here I was big with child. He asked me if it was a boy or a girl. Then they said they were in an awfully good mood and would like some tea. He stayed and chatted with us till about midnight. Only then did he say: 'We always come to you not knowing if we'll find what we want, but this time we know exactly what we've come for.' All of a sudden he pulled out a picture and said, 'You recognize him?' Ibrahim saw a naked man with a reddish skin and the legs torn off, one at the knee and one at the ankle. Captain Roni said, 'That's Muhi a-Din. You ready to identify him?' Ibrahim said he was ready to identify him 'seventy percent.' Captain Roni said, 'No, it's a hundred percent,' and he left. At two in the morning the Palestinian security people came and asked Ibrahim to come with them to the hospital in Ramallah. He went, and there he identified the body of Muhi a-Din. At six that morning, his brother Izhak went with the father and they identified the body too. The family asked about his clothes. They were told that they had not been found. A side note may be relevant: before executing a collaborator, it is customary to strip him, thus adding to the humiliation. Maysoun will name her baby "Muhi a-Din."

Who killed Muhi a-Din Sharif? Second account (April 2-6): "Israel did it." The PA's chief pathologist, Dr. Jalal Jabri, performed an autopsy on the body. He found three bullets, two in the lungs and one in a leg. (He reasoned that Sharif had first been shot in the leg to prevent escape.) The doctor also established that at the time of the explosion, Sharif had already been dead three hours. Despite these findings, Amir Oren, a veteran Israeli journalist, stuck to the original story: "According to the security forces, which in the course of their work were privy to the secrets of various operations, the police report from the (Israeli) Laboratory for Criminal Identification – as well as other reports – clearly show that the bullets that entered Sharif's body constituted a lethal part of the explosive device." (Ha'aretz, April 2, 1998). It is conceivable, indeed, that a bullet from a bomb Sharif was making flew to his heart. But it must be counted as nothing short of a miracle that this should happen three hours before the bomb exploded.

The PA was less inclined to believe in miracles. Faced with the findings, its response was to invite Dr. Jabri to the Preventive Security Offices, interrogate him, and suspend him from his job. All our efforts to locate him and talk with him have so far proved futile. The doctor's findings, however – followed by the fury of the mass funeral on April 2 – led to a change in the PA's account. For the first time, it pointed an accusing figure at Israel. From April 2 until April 6, the PA claimed to be checking two possibilities: either Sharif was shot by Palestinians collaborating with Israel or directly by Israel itself. It had also re-opened, it said, the question of "where exactly the killing occurred, before the body was brought to the garage."

During these five days US, Israeli, and Palestinian officials ran back and forth, consulting. Israel vehemently denied any connection to the murder. Defense Secretary Yitzhak Mordechai told American Ambassador Ned Walker that it was up to the PA to avert vengeance on Israel from the side of Hamas. He also went on television to announce that he had personally called the PA's Abu Mazen and solemnly declared Israel's innocence. The concern, in fact, was well-grounded. When the PA accuses Israel, this amounts to a green light for Hamas to make reprisals. Israel, we at Challenge believe, must have told the Americans to tell the Palestinians to squelch this dangerous speculation at once, else the PA would pay dearly. The two sides are, after all, at the height of negotiations over the second redeployment.

Who killed Muhi a-Din Sharif? Third account (April 6 - ): "Internal struggles in Hamas" On April 6 the PA's Preventive Security chief, Jibril Rajoub, came out with a surprise announcement at a press conference in Ramallah. It remains, in one variant or another, the PA's version today: "Adel Awadallah killed Muhi a-Din Sharif in the course of an internal struggle for control over Iz a-Din al-Kassam (the military wing of Hamas)." Rajoub claimed to have the confession of an eye witness, Hamas activist Ghassan Adasi. Not only was Adasi present during the argument and shooting, said Rajoub, but he had also – under Adel Awadallah's command – created the car bomb in order to cover up the murder. Rajoub sent this account to the local branch of the CIA, whose agents then received a guided tour of the garage in Betunia. Thus Rajoub threw the ball into the Hamas court, and the Islamic organization now had no alternative but to respond. Its political leadership (including Abed al Aziz Rentisi and Ismail Abu Shanav) rejected the new story and stuck to the notion that Israel was responsible. Then, on April 8, Reuters received and broadcast a homemade videotape, featuring a man who claimed to be Adel Awadallah. (He had wrapped a kaffiyah across his face, guerrilla-style). Awadallah (if it was he) vehemently denied the new PA version, saying that Muhi a-Din had been like a brother to him. He accused the PA, and especially Jibril Rajoub, of collaborating with Israel in the assassination of Sharif. Nevertheless, he continued, Hamas should direct its reprisals only against Israel. A circular of Iz a-Din al-Qassam appeared that same day reaffirming this position. The PA responded by closing the Reuters office in Gaza and arresting Rentisi (April 10), who had been quoted (perhaps misquoted) in the Jerusalem Post as blaming it for the killing. Yet the PA also amended its version a little: "It was not Adel, but rather his brother, Imad Awadallah, who killed Muhi a-Din Sharif in the presence of Ghassan Adasi."

In a meeting with Challenge on April 9, Sharif's brother Izhak told us: "I don't belong to Hamas, but I don't accept the new PA version, nor does my family. The members of Iz a-Din al-Kassam compete with each other, true, but not over position, rather over who will make the greater sacrifices. They don't get involved with assassinating even Fatah people – how then can anyone expect us to believe that they'd kill each other?" Ha'aretz correspondent Amira Hass has also held consistently to this point: "Assassination as a means of settling internal struggles is characteristic of Fatah, not Hamas." (Ha'aretz, April 7, 1998.)

On the other hand, Danny Rubenstein – another veteran journalist covering the Territories for Ha'aretz – raised nary an eyebrow when he summarized the final (so far) PA version on April 21, compiled from interviews given by Jibril Rajoub and by Ta'ib Abed al-Rahim, the chief of Arafat's office staff: "On Sunday, March 29, at six p.m., three members of the Hamas military wing from the Ramallah sector met secretly... in a garage belonging to the Adasi family. (According to the family, they do not own the garage; they merely rent a room in it. - RBE.) It had been rented two months earlier to Muhi a-Din Sharif, who was accustomed to stay there... Ghassan Adasi had arranged the hideaway for him... and Adasi used to bring food to him in the hideout, where the cadre met regularly. Al-Sharif was teaching Adasi to make explosive devices, in order that he should replace him in case he was caught or injured. "That evening ... Imad Awadallah was also there. (His brother Adel is considered the commander of the cadre.) According to Adasi, a fierce argument broke out between Sharif and Awadallah at the very start of the meeting... Its background was the ongoing tension between Sharif and the Awadallah brothers concerning the nature of the missions they were supposed to perform. Adel had instructed Sharif, for example, to prepare a bombing attack in revenge against Israel's attempt to assassinate Khaled Mashal in Jordan. Sharif had refused. There was also a money matter. Sharif claimed that he had not received funds to finance the missions as agreed. Suddenly Imad Awadallah went to the small Fiat that was there, opened its back door, took out a pistol, and put three bullets into Sharif at close range. Two hit him in the chest and one in the leg. He died, apparently, at once.

"Imad then ordered Adasi to prepare a bomb with a delayed timer, so that it would go off around nine p.m. and blur the signs of the shooting. Adasi made the bomb and set it for 8:45. He said a prayer and returned to his home. Imad Awadallah also slipped away to another hideout about a hundred meters from there."

Holes in the story
1. The Adasi family The latest PA version, just quoted, rests mainly on the confession of Ghassan Adasi, 19, a student at Bir Zeit University, who was supposed to be a candidate of the Islamic bloc in the student elections of March 30. Diana Mardi and I visited Adasi's home in al-Bireh on April 9. Many people were present, including most of the family members, who had been arrested in connection with the case and released. They were unanimous in their account: On the day of Sharif's death, Ghassan was at home all evening, except around 6:15, when he went to the mosque. He returned from prayer within the hour and remained home until his arrest several hours after the explosion. The oldest brother, Issam, spoke as follows: "If they were to bring Ghassan before me right now, and if he were to tell me that he himself killed Muhi a-Din, I'd tell him he was a liar, because he was with me, and I'm ready to testify to that in any courtroom." He continued: "On the afternoon of March 29 I was driving through Ramallah, when I saw my brother and drove him home. I was in the house with him till evening, when he and Soufian went to sleep. About 9:15 we got a phone call from friends who live next to the building, where we rent a room for our carpentry. (The building is on the other side of town. - RBE.) They told us there'd been an explosion. I went with my father around 9:30 to see if there was any damage, and the PA arrested us. Another brother of mine, Sultan, also heard about the blast, went there and was arrested. Later they came to our house and arrested my brother Soufian, who works at the carpentry. Finally, at 11:00, they came again and arrested Ghassan. We were five members of one family, all under arrest, and we were interrogated separately that night by the heads of the PA: Ismail Jaber, Ta'ib Abed al Rahim, Jibril Rajoub, and others. We were all subjected to violence. They demanded we confess that we were connected to the explosion, or they would accuse us of being collaborators. In the morning they let us all go, except for Ghassan. They arrested Sultan and Soufian again between the fourth and the sixth of April. Soufian came back heavily bruised."

On April 27 we spoke once again with Issam Adasi. He said that no one had seen Ghassan since the night of his arrest. According to what the family had heard, he had retracted his confession. Now they feared for his life. In their effort to visit him, they had retained a lawyer, Khader Shakirat, and they had brought Amnesty International into the case. Bir Zeit University has also sent out alerts. There is also evidence, reported by Nigel Parry, concerning Ghassan Adasi's activities earlier in the day. A friend of Ghassan's, Shadi Abu Hawa, told Parry that he was with Ghassan making election posters at Bir Zeit University from about noon until 6:00 p.m. (For additional material, see Parry's website: .)

2. The Awadallah family. On April 22, we visited the parents and wife of Imad Awadallah. They too contest the PA's version. Shifa, his wife, states firmly: "Imad was in hiding with me. We lived in an apartment near Betunia. He couldn't go out. I am ready to swear in whatever setting you want that he was with me and the children at home for five days continuously before the explosion." On April 11 at seven in the morning, Palestinian security troops surrounded their hideout. (Among them was Shifa's brother.) How did they find it? They had arrested Amer, Imad's brother, on April 6th in the mosque. It is possible that under torture he told them. Today both brothers are under arrest, and no lawyer can see them.

3. Further questions Apart from the testimonies of the Adasi and Awadallah families, there are other reasons to doubt the PA's latest account and, beyond that, to suspect its involvement in the death of Sharif. First, the PA kept changing the story. If you do not know what happened, you wait to find out. Who does not wait? Someone who knows what happened – and wants to cover it up with a different account. The PA's first account would have sufficed, had it not been for the findings of the pathologist. It promptly suspended him, and he has not been heard from since. The PA arrested Ghassan Adasi and four other members of his family on the night of Sharif's death. It released his father and three brothers the next day. Why did it keep Ghassan? Had he broken down and confessed? This does not quite make sense. If he had already made the confession that the PA later attributed to him (strife within Hamas), why then did the PA (faced with the pathologist's findings) come out with a different account, namely, the accusation against Israel, maintaining this for five days? The PA was warned to lay off Israel, and only then did it come forth with Ghassan's confession. But here too it ran into a problem: the Hamas videotape. The PA found the masked man believable enough, it seems, to alter what Ghassan had allegedly said. No, it wasn't Adel, after all, who killed Sharif, but rather Adel's brother, Imad.

Nor does Ghassan's alleged confession make sense. It presents the killing as a spontaneous act, the result of an argument, followed by a hastily improvised cover-up: a 19-year-old student, apprentice to the murdered man, prepares a car bomb and sets it for 8:45, giving the killer enough time to escape. But Hamas is an organization. One of its members cannot spontaneously kill a top leader and expect to get away with it, coolly leaving another member behind, a witness who – we are supposed to believe – then risked his life preparing a bomb to go off in a garage where his father has a carpentry? Wouldn't the witness report, instead, back to Hamas? (According to material gathered by Nigel Parry (see above), the carpentry was not insured, and its destruction has left the father with unpaid loans amounting to $22,000.) Suppose, however, that the killing was not spontaneous. Suppose that someone higher up in Hamas had sent Imad Awadallah to kill Sharif, that Ghassan was part of the plot, and that Ghassan, confessing and fearing reprisal, had tried to play down his role. But if the murder had been planned in advance, would the Hamas leader have chosen a garage where the Adasi family rents space for its carpentry – knowing that the family, including Ghassan, would then be interrogated? Furthermore, if Hamas killed Sharif, why would it attempt to cover up the murder by staging a "work accident," making its people look incompetent and gratifying the Israelis? Why not leave the body with the bullets in it, since the natural suspects would be Israel or the PA?

Another oddity:
According to the confession, the blast was intended to blur the marks of the shooting. But Sharif's body was found at a distance from the car, behind a pillar, relatively undamaged. According to the family members who identified him, the bullet holes in his chest were quite apparent. If the intent had been to blur the marks, wouldn't it have made more sense to put the body in the car and blow it to bits? Whoever killed Sharif wanted him to be identified and did not mind if the bullet holes were seen. Finally, if the PA has at last uncovered and revealed the true account, why doesn't it let the key witnesses meet with their lawyers? And where is that pathologist? It is now a month since the assassination. The flounderings and contradictions in the PA stories have raised questions, also, among the security forces in Israel. On April 26, in Yediot Aharonot, the following appeared from the pen of journalist Alex Fishman: "Security personnel have announced that the investigation into the death of Sharif has reached a dead end. From the evidence that has accumulated until now, they say, it appears that the confessions of Ghassan Adasi, who is suspected of complicity in the murder, were extracted from him by force. The investigation also casts doubt on the part played by Imad Awadallah, the Hamas member, in the killing of Sharif." (One cannot help wonder, by the way, what strange ideas could possibly lead Israel's security personnel, of all people, to doubt the validity of confessions extracted by force.)

Possibilities
Two parties, Israel and the PA, had reasons to capture or kill Muhi a-Din Sharif. After the assassination of Yehieh Ayyash, "Engineer # 1," Sharif became the new chief of Hamas bombing operations. Israel held him responsible for the deaths of 65 people. He headed the "wanted list" it delivered to Arafat. The PA, for its part, views the military wing of Hamas as a threefold threat. It undermines the PA's authority with its own people. By the carnage of its bombing attacks, it scuttles Arafat's chances of finding an accommodation with Israel. The attacks also raise doubts among the Americans about his ability to deliver. The possibility arises, then, that Sharif was eliminated as a result of cooperation between Israel and the PA.. Such mutual help was already anchored in the Oslo agreement. In this spirit, the PA extradited two Hamas members from the village of Tzurif on November 13, 1997. (See Challenge # 47, "Oops! The Palestinian Authority 'loses' two prisoners to Israel."). They had been held in a Palestinian jail, but while the PA was transferring them from Hebron to Nablus, its van was stopped – as if by chance – at an ad hoc Israeli roadblock. The "accidental" extradition occasioned stormy protests against Jibril Rajoub, but Hamas let the incident drop. Thus the PA was able to show its partners that it was strong enough to extradite Palestinians to Israel and ride out, nonetheless, the public storm.

A month later, on December 17, 1997, Israel and the PA reaffirmed their commitment to security cooperation in an agreement mediated by the CIA representative in Tel Aviv, Stan Moskowitz. That was also the month when Israel captured Abdallah Ibrahim al-Bakhri. In the indictment brought against him in March (shortly before Sharif's death), it was stated that al-Bakhri had been, till his capture, the right-hand man of Muhi a-Din Sharif, and that he had helped him to hide. It is possible that during his interrogation, al-Bakhri supplied information that the Israelis passed on to the PA, which then could have caught Sharif, killed him, and staged the "work accident." Another possibility, often raised by the Palestinians themselves, is that one or several collaborators planted by Israel killed Sharif independently. The flaw in this hypothesis, however, is that the preparation of a bomb requires an infrastructure beyond any that is available to collaborators. Only three parties possess that infrastructure: Hamas, the PA, and Israel. We have already raised enough questions to rule out Hamas as a possibility. The ones with strong motives were Israel and the PA. The explosion occurred in the area controlled by the PA. Israel might have staged it there in order to shift the blame and ward off revenge. But it would have been easier and less risky for the PA to do it – and besides, we now have the pile of contradictory PA versions.

Who has the key to what happened? In the case of Engineer # 1, Yehieh Ayyash, Israel did not deny responsibility for the killing, and there followed a series of bloody reprisals which cost Shimon Peres the election. In the present instance, Israel does not want to take credit, even tacitly, out of fear of a repeat performance. The PA, for its part, wants to show the US it is doing its bit, but it does not want to expose the full extent of its cooperation for fear of losing out to Hamas in the eyes of the people. As a result, the only party that is in a position to examine itself and reveal its findings is Hamas. It can ask when its members last saw Sharif, where he was living, who his contacts were. It remains a question, however, whether Hamas is interested in revealing the truth. At the height of the crisis, while the PA was arresting dozens of Hamas people, calls began to resound on all sides for a "cease fire" in the war of words. There were even rumors of meetings in Gaza between the two sides, although Hamas leader Sheikh Mahmud al-Zahar denied them in a statement to Challenge on April 15. It is clear, in any case, that Hamas is exhibiting extraordinary – some might say embarrassing – restraint. People close to the movement explain this by referring to apprehensions of civil war. One of them told us that if Hamas were to publish all it knew, some hothead might assassinate Jibril Rajoub, sending the Territories into a tailspin of factional infighting, that is, Lebanonization. Whatever the case may be, the Islamic movement is indeed behaving for now as if the affair were a potato too hot to hold.

On the other hand, if Hamas avoids finding out what it can – if it smooths over the assassination of Muhi a-Din Sharif as it did the extradition of the two from Tzurif – then it will have given Arafat a green light to carry on with his dictatorship of blood. Even if the PA had not laid the responsibility for Sharif's death at its door, Hamas would owe it to itself, indeed to all Palestinians, to find out and report how one of its leaders came to be assassinated. Otherwise it will not be able to maintain its status as a serious opposition. Nor can it evade this task by launching reprisals against Israel. If the PA had a part in the murder of Muhi a-Din Sharif, then it is up to Hamas to bring this to light, so that all Palestinians may clearly assess the reality in which they live.

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